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INTRODUCTION
Commentators have long identified poor coordination between
health care providers, particularly physicians and hospitals, as a key
contributor to the continuing cost and quality problems plaguing the
United States health care delivery system.1 This lack of coordination
* © 2011 Andrew A. Kasper.
1. See, e.g., Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The
Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, w44, w55-w56
(2007).
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undermines continuity of care, leading to medical error2 and
unnecessary or duplicative services.' There are a number of factors
that contribute to this coordination failure-the fragmentation of
providers; diverging economic incentives facing different provider
groups; and the technological, structural, and legal barriers to sharing
patient information between providers, to name only a few.4
Providers, insurers, regulators, and policymakers have made a
number of attempts to increase coordination between physicians and
hospitals with only limited success.' Most notably, the increase in
insurer bargaining power accompanying the rise of managed care
6
2. A highly debated report by the Institute of Medicine ("IOM") estimated that
between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die each year in hospitals due to medical error. COMM.
ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A
SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson eds.,
2000). IOM identified the "decentralized and fragmented nature of the health care
delivery system" and "patients see[ing] multiple providers in different settings, none of
whom has access to complete information" as key causes of medical errors. Id. at 3. For a
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the IOM analysis, compare Clement J.
McDonald, Michael Weiner & Siu L. Hui, Deaths Due to Medical Error Are Exaggerated
in Institute of Medicine Report, 284 JAMA 93, 93-94 (2000) (arguing that the IOM Report
exaggerates the number of deaths attributable to medical error because it fails to consider
limitations of the studies that form the basis of the IOM's estimates), with Lucian L.
Leape, Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95
passim (2000) (arguing that limitations in the studies underlying the IOM Report had the
effect of both understating and overstating the number of deaths attributable to medical
error, suggesting that IOM's estimates were likely reasonable).
3. Commentators have cited imaging as one area where unnecessary or duplicative
services are commonly provided. See, e.g., John K. Iglehart, Health Insurers and Medical
Imaging Policy-A Work in Progress, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1030, 1030 (2009). Studies
have estimated that more than twenty billion dollars is wasted each year on unnecessary or
duplicative imaging. AM. HEALTH INS. PLANS, ENSURING QUALITY THROUGH
APPROPRIATE USE OF DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING 2 (2008), available at http://www.ahip.org
/content/default.aspx?docid=24057.
4. See Thomas (Tim) Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational
Fragmentation in Health Care, 71 U. PITr. L. REV. 217,225-30 (2009).
5. See Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible
Partnerships Between Health Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF., 32, 34-35 (2011).
6. While managed care entities can take on a variety of forms, the two most common
structures are health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") and preferred provider
organizations ("PPOs"). Sharon L. Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care:
Placebo or Wonder Drug for Health Care Fraud and Abuse, 31 GA. L. REV. 373, 379
(1997). "HMOs both bear the risk of financing health care and provide care themselves,"
either through employed providers or independent providers contracting with the HMOs.
Id. In a PPO, a physician agrees to accept discounted fee-for-service payments and other
cost and utilization control measures from an insurer in return for being included in the
insurer's limited provider network. Id. In 2010, approximately sixty-six million individuals
were enrolled in HMO plans and fifty-three million individuals were enrolled in PPO
plans in the United States. Managed Care Fact Sheets, MCOL, http://www.mcareol.com
/factshts/factnati.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
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prompted physicians and hospitals to ally in order to ward off steep
payment cuts. 7 However, as managed care plans became unpopular
with consumers and lost their clout in the marketplace, these alliances
began to break down.' Some physician groups exacerbated this move
away from coordination by developing ambulatory surgical centers
and other outpatient treatment centers that directly compete with
inpatient services offered by hospitals.9 Regulations limiting the ways
in which hospitals can collaborate with physicians also weakened
alliances.10
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
("PPACA") includes a number of initiatives intended to reverse this
trend and improve coordination between provider groups, including
physicians and hospitals. These initiatives include pilot testing of
bundled payments to physicians and hospitals 2 as well as payments to
providers to reduce unnecessary hospital readmissions. 3 Perhaps the
most promising vehicle for improving coordination of care between
physicians and hospitals is the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 4
which provides for the establishment of accountable care
organizations ("ACOs"). ACOs are networks of primary care
physicians, specialists, hospitals, and other providers that contract
with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") to
supply medical services for a defined population of Medicare Part A
and Part B" beneficiaries. 6 ACOs must develop and implement
7. Lawrence P. Casalino, The Federal Trade Commission, Clinical Integration, and
the Organization of Physician Practice, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 569, 570-71 (2006).
8. See Fisher et al., supra note 1, at w54 (summarizing the trend away from
physician-hospital collaboration).
9. See id.; Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 34.
10. See Richard S. Saver, Squandering the Gain: Gainsharing and the Continuing
Dilemma of Physician Financial Incentives, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 150-53 (2003)
(discussing the legal barriers to development of gainsharing contracts between hospitals
and physicians); V. Michel Magloire Marcoux, Comment, Why Healthcare Fraud and
Abuse Laws Should Allow Appropriate Hospital Gainsharing, 59 ALA. L. REV. 539, 539-
40 (2008) (same).
11. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4 (West Supp. 2011). Under the payment bundling pilot
program, CMS will make a single payment to groups of hospitals, physicians, and other
providers for "an episode of care provided to an applicable beneficiary around a
hospitalization in order to improve.., coordination, quality, and efficiency." See § 1395cc-
4(a)(1).
13. Mark McClellan et al., A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice,
29 HEALTH AFF. 982, 987 (2010).
14. § 1395jjj.
15. The Medicare program provides medical coverage for seniors and the disabled
and has four components: an inpatient hospital benefit (Part A); an outpatient benefit that
covers both items and services (Part B); a private plan benefit (Medicare Advantage); and
2011]
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processes and technologies to coordinate patient care and improve
quality and efficiency and will share in any resulting cost savings to
Medicare for the patient population. 7  Hospitals have been
particularly bullish about ACOs, with over seventy percent of
hospital managers believing their institution will participate in an
ACO in the next five years. 18
However, the promise offered by the Shared Savings Program
does not come without substantial risks, both to patients and payers.
These risks include the potential for excess utilization and,
conversely, for rationing care."9 Arguably, the most significant
concern is that the joint negotiation of payment rates by providers
will allow dominant market players to extract substantial price
concessions from insurers, further increasing the already skyrocketing
growth of health care costs in the United States. Recent reports of a
wave of consolidation among health care providers following passage
of the PPACA20 and rapidly increasing provider payment rates as a
result of increased bargaining leverage2' have only fueled these
concerns. While price fixing does not pose a substantial concern with
Medicare ACOs since CMS sets Part A and Part B payment rates,22
a prescription drug benefit (Part D). The Shared Savings Program is limited to items and
services covered by Part A and Part B. See § 1395jjj(a)(1). As of September 2011, forty-
nine million beneficiaries were enrolled in the Medicare program. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., FACT SHEET: MEDICARE SPENDING AND FINANCING (2011), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7305-06.pdf. Medicare spending is expected to reach
five hundred fifty-five dollars in 2011. Id.
16. See, e.g., McClellan et al., supra note 13, at 982-83.
17. See id.
18. Stephen M. Shortell, Lawrence P. Casalino & Elliott S. Fisher, How the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation Should Test Accountable Care Organizations, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1293, 1294 (2010).
19. See Elliott S. Fisher & Stephen M. Shortell, Accountable Care Organizations:
Accountable for What, to Whom, and How, 304 JAMA 1715,1715 (2010).
20. Robert Pear, As Health Law Spurs Mergers, Risks Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2010, at Al.
21. Robert A. Berenson, Paul B. Ginsburg & Nicole Kemper, Unchecked Provider
Clout in California Foreshadows Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 699
(2010).
22. Medicare reimburses Part A providers, which are typically hospitals, through a
prospective payment system-a form of bundled payment. See Judith R. Lave, The Impact
of the Medicare Prospective Payment System and Recommendations for Change, 7 YALE J.
ON REG. 499, 500-07 (1990). Medicare's prospective payment system gives hospitals a
single payment for all of the services furnished to a beneficiary with a particular diagnosis
during a single episode of care. See id. at 505-06. Medicare Part B providers are
reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis, receiving a payment for each service provided to a
beneficiary. Alice G. Gosfield, Value Purchasing in Medicare Law: Precursor to Health
Reform, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 169, 173-77 (1994). The payment rates are set out by CMS in
[Vol. 90
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potential ACO participants have expressed interest in marketing their
ACOs to private payers as well,23 where joint price negotiation is a
significant concern.
To provide guidance to ACOs operating in the private market,
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Department of
Justice ("DOJ"), in consultation with CMS, recently released their
final Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding
Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared
Savings Program24 ("ACO Statement"). The ACO Statement was the
product of a contentious rulemaking process, during which release of
the draft version of the document was repeatedly delayed, reportedly
as a result of disagreements between FTC and DOJ about how
rigorous antitrust review should be for ACOs that include both
physicians and hospitals.25 Following release of the draft version of
the ACO Statement and CMS' proposed rule implementing the
Shared Savings Program, prospective ACO participants widely
criticized both documents as overly burdensome and insufficiently
flexible to allow for robust participation in the program. 6 The final
ACO Statement and CMS implementing regulations for the Shared
Savings Program (the "Rule") were released together in October
2011.
Prospective participants requested that ACOs satisfying the
Shared Savings Program requirements be immune from antitrust
enforcement for their private sector activities, stating that without
such protection from antitrust liability risk, they would be deterred
from participating. 7 The final ACO Statement stops short of
an annual fee schedule and are designed to reflect the relative value of different services,
inflation, and changes in technology. Id.
23. See Michael Wroblewski, Deputy Dir., FTC Office of Policy Planning, Remarks at
the Workshop Regarding Accountable Care Organizations and Implications Regarding
Antitrust, Physicians Self-Referral, Anti-Kickback and Civil Monetary Penalty Laws 18
(Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter ACO Workshop], available at http://www.cms.gov
/PhysicianFeeSched/downloads/10-5-10ACO-WorkshopAMSessionTranscript.pdf
("ACOs that participate in the Medicare Shared Savings Program are likely to use the
same organizational and operational structure for private payers.").
24. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026
(Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter ACO Statement].
25. See Robert Pear, Antitrust Concerns Are Raised on New Law's Doctor-Hospital
Collaborations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at A19.
26. See, e.g., infra note 83 (outlining Cleveland Clinic's criticism of the proposed rule).
27. Letter from Charles N. Kahn, President, Fed'n of Am. Hosps., to Donald Berwick,
Adm'r, CMS (Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco/101027fah
.pdf ("[T]here [should] be a 'statutory requirements' safe-harbor, such that when an ACO
meets the integration requirements established by CMS for the Medicare program, and is
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immunizing all private sector ACOs from antitrust enforcement, but
it does establish an antitrust safety zone for certain ACOs that satisfy
CMS' final Rule and meet market share and exclusivity
requirements. 28 With one notable exception,29 FTC and DOJ's
antitrust enforcement policy treats ACOs that include nonphysician
entities, particularly hospitals ("hospital ACOs"), the same as ACOs
that include only physicians. This enforcement regime represents a
stark change from F-FC and DOJ's Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care3" ("Guidelines")-the primary
document governing health care antitrust enforcement policy over the
last fifteen years-under which provider networks, including
hospitals, are subject to more rigorous antitrust scrutiny. In particular,
under the Guidelines, an antitrust safety zone does not exist for
provider networks that include hospitals, while a safety zone does
exist for physician-only networks.31 Under the final ACO Statement,
both types of networks are eligible for the antitrust safety zone
provided they satisfy all requirements.
This Comment argues that FTC and DOJ went too far in relaxing
the antitrust review regime for hospital networks for purposes of the
ACO program. The agencies correctly recognized that the unique
benefits of hospital participation warrant creation of a safety zone for
hospital ACOs. However, in electing to implement a safety zone for
hospital ACOs that largely mirrors that of physician ACOs, the
agencies failed to adequately account for the singular competitive
risks posed by hospital participation. Hospital ACOs should be
subject to more searching antitrust review than physician-only ACOs
because of high concentration in the hospital sector-particularly
notable when compared to substantial fragmentation in the physician
marketplace; unique vertical and horizontal integration risks posed by
hospital ACOs; and concerns about making hospitals the dominant
entity in medical care provision. This Comment recommends that the
approved by CMS, the antitrust agencies should refrain from an enforcement action for
price-fixing if the ACO uses the same organizational structure in dealings with private
payers.").
28. ACO Statement, supra note 24, at 67,028-29. For an extended discussion of the
market share and exclusivity requirements, see infra Part I.C.
29. For purposes of the ACO antitrust safety zone, hospitals and ambulatory surgical
centers must be nonexclusive to a particular ACO, a requirement that does not exist for all
other potential ACO participants. ACO Statement, supra note 24, at 67,028-29.
30. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in Health Care, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,153, at 20,799 (1996) [hereinafter
Guidelines].
31. See infra Part lI.B.
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agencies revise the ACO Statement to require hospital ACOs to
engage in two-sided financial risk sharing in order to qualify for the
safety zone. This addition is necessary because financial integration
clearly evidences participants' intent to create efficiencies and has a
demonstrable record of driving efficiencies through decreased
utilization and less hospital intensive care. This examination of the
antitrust enforcement issues with hospital ACOs also illustrates the
close interrelationship between CMS' Rule and FTC and DOJ's ACO
Statement, demonstrating that changes to one of the documents will
in many cases require a simultaneous change to the other.
Part I of this Comment outlines the statutory and regulatory
Medicare ACO requirements, as well as some existing entities that
will likely serve as models for ACOs, paying particular attention to
the potential role of hospitals in ACOs. Part II presents the
competitive framework for health care providers, discussing how
antitrust statutes have historically been applied in the health care
sector and FTC and DOJ's antitrust enforcement regime for
Medicare ACOs. Part III considers arguments for and against
heightened antitrust barriers for hospital ACOs and assesses the
agencies' decision not to subject hospital ACOs to heightened
antitrust scrutiny. Part III also evaluates how CMS' Shared Savings
Program Rule impacts antitrust review of ACOs offered in the
private market, concluding that loosening ACO program
participation regulations will often require a tightening of antitrust
enforcement regulations.
I. ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS
ACOs are intended to be networks of providers that are
accountable for the cost and quality of care of a defined population of
patients, with ACO participants jointly sharing in any cost savings
resulting from the increased care coordination and efficiency offered
by the network. Before outlining the statutory and regulatory
requirements for participation in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program and introducing some existing health care delivery entities
that may serve as models for ACOs, it is useful to provide some
background on the conceptual development of ACOs, the policy
goals they were designed to achieve, and the legislative history of the
Shared Savings Program.
A. Conceptual Background
ACOs, which were first introduced by Professor Elliott Fisher
and his colleagues at the Dartmouth University Center for Health
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Policy and Clinical Practice, were originally designed to reduce
Medicare spending growth in certain hospital services areas by
leveraging the fact that Medicare beneficiaries tend to receive "most
of their care from relatively coherent local delivery systems
comprising physicians and the hospitals where they work or admit
their patients."32 Professor Fisher realized that this group of
providers, or "extended hospital medical staff," which the authors
identified empirically through beneficiary claims data, could be used
as a "locus of accountability" for quality and cost performance.33 His
team envisioned savings accruing through more coordinated care and
more efficient capacity decisions by local providers, which would then
slow the growth in use of expensive discretionary "supply-sensitive"
services such as imaging and testing, frequently offered by hospitals.34
Thus, from the outset, hospitals were viewed as a critical component
of the ACO model.
Over time, the ACO concept evolved to also incorporate
physician payment reform, most notably through the use of
population-based shared savings payments.35 Shared savings is a form
of one-sided risk sharing, under which a provider benefits from any
decreases in expenditure relative to a preestablished baseline, but is
not liable for any increase in expenditure.36 Under the original ACO
shared savings model, a variety of providers would band together and
agree to be jointly accountable for the cost and quality of care for an
empirically defined population of patients.37 If the expenditures for
the population were less than a preestablished benchmark, with no
associated decline in the quality, ACO members would be entitled to
a bonus payment covering a portion of the savings to Medicare. 38 The
key insight underpinning a population-based shared savings system is
that patients already receive the vast majority of their care through
the extended hospital staff defined above. 39 These organic provider
referral networks allow for meaningful provider performance
32. Fisher et al., supra note 1, at w44. The authors found that on average 72.7% of
beneficiaries' physician visits and 63.5% of beneficiaries' hospital admissions fell within
these limited networks of physicians and hospitals. Id. at w48.
33. Id. at w45-w51.
34. Id. at w53.
35. See Elliott S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in
Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE w219, w222-23 (2009).
36. McClellan et al., supra note 13, at 984.
37. Fisher et al., supra note 35, at w222-23.
38. Id. at w222.
39. Id. at w227.
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assessment without having to resort to closed provider networks,
which are unattractive to many patients.'
From these conceptual bases-the establishment of a
multiprovider locus of accountability and physician payment reform
through shared savings-four policy rationales for ACOs become
apparent. First, ACOs are intended to decrease provider
fragmentation and foster improved coordination of care among
providers.41 Second, this improved coordination is expected to create
more robust mechanisms for provider performance measurement.42
Third, the ACO shared savings payment method is designed to align
the utilization incentives facing different groups of providers,
particularly physicians and hospitals.43 Typically physician and
hospital utilization incentives diverge since physicians are paid on a
fee-for-service basis and thus have an incentive to increase
utilization," whereas hospitals are reimbursed prospectively and thus
have an incentive to only provide the minimum treatment necessary
once a patient has been admitted.4 5 However, under a shared savings
system both physicians and hospitals arguably have an incentive to
control costs in order to maximize their bonus payment.46 Moreover,
proponents of ACOs also see shared savings payments as a first step
toward bundled payments for hospitals and physicians. Under a
bundled payment model, providers jointly receive a single payment
40. In health plans with closed provider networks, patients only have access to
providers that are under contract with the plan. Closed provider networks are frequently
used by HMOs and other managed care plans, but are unpopular with patients because
they restrict patients' abilities to choose their own health care providers. Berenson et al.,
supra note 21, at 701. Consumer displeasure with restraints on provider choice has been
identified as one cause of the backlash against managed care in the late 1990s. Id.
41. See Shortell et al., supra note 18, at 1294.
42. See McClellan et al., supra note 13, at 985-87.
43. See Shortell et al., supra note 18, at 1294.
44. See James C. Robinson, Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment
Incentives, 79 MILBANK Q. 149, 151-52 (2001).
45. Under a prospective payment system, a provider is reimbursed at a predetermined
rate for treating a particular patient with a particular illness. See Mark A. Hall, Rate
Appeals Under Medicare's New Payment System: Reflections on the Meaning of
"Prospectivity," 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 407, 408 (1986). Prospective payment systems create
two incentives for hospitals: (1) an incentive to increase the number of patients admitted
to hospitals (the "extensive margin"), see infra note 263 and accompanying text, and (2) an
incentive to provide the minimum care necessary once a patient has been admitted (the
"intensive margin"), see James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving
Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 210
(1996).
46. McClellan et al., supra note 13, at 984-85 ("Participating providers are also held
accountable for a portion of any excessive spending through reductions in future bonus
payments.").
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covering the entire continuum of care for a patient with a single
condition or procedure.47 Bundled-payment programs are desirable
because they have been shown to both increase quality and lower
costs.
48
Finally, ACOs are constructed to shift patient care away from
hospitals to the primary care setting. Commentators have long
advocated delivery models that drive such a shift, citing studies of
integrated care systems finding substantial aggregate cost savings due
solely to less hospital intensive care.49 Moreover, a move toward
primary care is attractive to CMS because reducing avoidable hospital
services represents the largest opportunity to control Medicare
costs."0 While hospitals have traditionally pushed back against efforts
to control inpatient volume,5 allowing hospitals to capture some of
the cost savings associated with less hospital intensive care may make
them more amenable to such efforts.
These policy rationales also appear to have motivated Congress
to include ACOs in the PPACA. Early versions of the health reform
legislation in the House of Representatives12 and the Senate53
included ACO programs.54 While the legislative record on ACOs is
relatively thin,55 Congress appears to have viewed ACOs as providing
47. Shortell et al., supra note 18, at 1294.
48. Martin Gaynor, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Presentation to MedPAC, Provider
Integration and Impacts on Competition (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.medpac
.gov/transcripts/Gaynor%20presentation.pdf (accessed by scrolling to page twenty of the
presentation slides).
49. See, e.g., Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical
Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 251, 265-67 (1987).
50. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 33.
51. For example, in the 1990s, numerous hospitals acquired physician practices in an
effort to stave off potential cuts resulting from the Clinton administration's health reform
efforts. See id.
52. Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 1301 (as introduced in the
House, Oct. 29, 2009).
53. America's Health Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 3022 (2009).
54. While the House bill language regarding ACOs largely tracked that of the Senate,
there were two key differences. First, the House bill only called for pilot testing of
Medicare ACOs, rather than full implementation of an ACO program as is provided in
the Senate bill. Taylor Burke & Sara Rosenbaum, Accountable Care Organizations:
Implications for Antitrust Policy, 19 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 358, 359-61 (2010), available
at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/57509.pdf. Second, the House bill provided for the
testing of a variety of payment methods including performance target and partial
capitation models, whereas the Senate bill only included a shared savings payment model.
Id. at 360.
55. This thin legislative record likely reflects both that the Shared Savings Program is
a small part of a large, complex bill and that there was no conference to integrate the
House and Senate bills.
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a legal mechanism for a variety of providers to integrate and become
jointly responsible for the quality and cost of care of defined
populations of patients.16 Congress intended for the ACO program to
expand upon CMS' Medicare Physician Group Practice
demonstration project, established through the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,"7 by allowing
for participation of nonphysician providers.58 In addition, Congress
appears to have viewed the ACO program and hospital-physician
bundled payment programs as intimately related, placing the
payment-bundling pilot program immediately after the Shared
Savings Program in the bill.59 As Senator Maria Cantwell explained
during the Finance Committee's markup of its draft of the bill,
"accountable care organizations and global budgeting... will
definitely move [the health care system] towards this goal of really
driving down costs."'  In the context of hospital participation in
ACOs, this connection is notable since payment bundling pilot
programs are required to include at least one hospital.61
Congress's decision to include ACOs in the PPACA appears to
stem from a recommendation by the congressionally established
Medicare Payment Advisory Committee ("MedPAC").62 In its June
56. See S. REP. No. 111-89, at 168 (2009) ("There are no existing laws that directly
address the ability of organizations or systems of integrated providers to share in the
efficiency gains resulting from the joint responsibility for and care of Medicare
beneficiaries. However, while some providers who deliver care in a vertically integrated
managed care environment under Medicare are able to achieve these efficiency gains (e.g.,
a staff-model managed care organization), other providers face obstacles to this type of
practice and related potential sharing (e.g., fee-for-service providers who practice across a
range of separate legal entities).").
57. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
58. See S. REP. No. 111-89, at 169 ("Accountable care organizations would go beyond
the [Physician Group Practice demonstration project] model, which is based on physician
groups, to include additional providers.").
59. See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong.
§§ 3022-3023 (2010) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119).
60. Executive Committee Meeting to Consider Health Care Reform: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 278 (2009) (statement of Sen. Maria Cantwell, Member,
Comm. on Fin.), available at http://finance.senate.govlibrary/transcripts/download/?id=
8d183331-c6bc-43e5-bb3a-66d230e7e209.
61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2011).
62. See S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 168 ("MedPAC has been among the proponents that
have encouraged this type of gain sharing through accountable care organizations."); see
also Executive Business Meeting to Consider an Original Bill Providing for Health Care
Reform: Meeting of the S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 195 (2009) (statement of Mark
Miller, Dir., MedPAC), available at http://finance.senate.gov/library/transcripts/download
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2009 report to Congress, MedPAC recommended that Congress
consider introducing ACOs to the Medicare program, explaining that
"[t]he goal is to create an incentive for providers in the ACO to
constrain volume growth while improving the quality of care."63
MedPAC suggested two ACO models: a voluntary, bonus-only model
and a mandatory, bonus-and-withhold model.' Under either
MedPAC model, ACOs would include physicians, specialists, and, at
a minimum, one hospital.65  However, unlike the MedPAC
recommendation, neither the Senate nor House bills mandated
hospital participation in ACOs. The legislative record does not
provide any guidance on why Congress altered the original MedPAC
model in this fashion.
There are at least two ways to interpret Congress's decision not
to mandate hospital participation in ACOs. ACOs were primarily
expected to drive savings through reducing spending growth for
hospital services, and thus Congress may have been concerned that
requiring hospital participation in ACOs would undermine the
effectiveness of the program since hospital members would have an
incentive to minimize their own revenue losses and not maximize
savings. Physician-only ACOs would not face the same incentive
problem because they could drive savings for their patient population
through decreasing hospital services expenditures without an
attendant decrease in the volume of services rendered by their
physician members. This interpretation is supported by the results of
the Physician Group Practice demonstration project, where
participating entities closely affiliated with hospitals failed to achieve
significant cost savings, while group practices unaffiliated with
hospitals did.66 Alternatively, Congress may have viewed hospitals as
an important component of ACOs but also wanted the ACO
/?id=2eff87ab-56d7-47b7-a46e-4b4f5cOf2c2b ("[T]here are a number of things in the bill
that MedPAC has recommended .... There are many things in the bill where we are
testing ideas-bundling, accountable care organizations, that type of thing.").
63. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: IMPROVING
INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 39 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov
/documents/Jun09-entirereport.pdf.
64. Id. at 43. Under the bonus-only model, the provider would receive a bonus
payment if the spending growth for its assigned patient population was less than a pre-
established baseline. See id. at 43-44. Under the bonus-and-withhold model, providers
would receive bonus payments if expenditures for their patient population were less than a
preestablished baseline, but would have a portion of their prospective payment withheld if
expenditures substantially exceeded expectations. See id. at 46.
65. Id. at 39.
66. John K. Iglehart, Assessing an ACO Prototype-Medicare's Physician Group
Practice Demonstration, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198,200 (2011).
[Vol. 90
2011] ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 215
structure to be extremely flexible in order to maximize provider
participation in the program. The latter interpretation is supported by
Congress's desire for the ACO program to expand upon the Physician
Group Practice demonstration project by including new provider
groups and its belief that the Shared Savings Program is intimately
related to the payment bundling pilot.
B. Statutory Requirements
The PPACA participation requirements for the Shared Savings
Program, which must be in place by January 1, 2012,67 flow from the
policy goals underlying the development of ACOs. Reflecting
concerns over lack of coordination among providers, the PPACA
allows for the formation of ACOs by a broad variety of providers and
suppliers, ranging from independent physician practices to hospitals.
Entities eligible to participate in the program are
(A) ACO professionals in group practice arrangements.
(B) Networks of individual practices of ACO professionals.
(C) Partnerships or joint venture arrangements between
hospitals and ACO professionals.
(D) Hospitals employing ACO professionals.
(E) Such other groups of providers of services and suppliers as
the Secretary determines appropriate.68
Despite the fact that hospitals were initially viewed as a critical
component of ACOs, primary care physicians, who are "central" to
ACO quality and cost saving goals,69 are the only type of provider
that must be included in a Medicare ACO.70
In order to participate in the Shared Savings Program,
prospective ACOs must satisfy governance, quality, and
accountability requirements set forth in the statute.71 In particular,
ACOs must establish a formal legal structure that allows for the
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011).
68. § 1395jjj(b)(1).
69. See McClellan et al., supra note 13, at 985 ("Although the [ACO] itself is
ultimately held accountable for all costs related to this defined patient population-
including costs for providers not participating in the ACO-the model itself is rooted in
existing relationships between primary care physicians and their patients.").
70. See § 1395jjj(b)(2)(D) ("The ACO shall include primary care ACO professionals
that are sufficient for the number of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to the
ACO.").
71. § 1395jjj(b)(2).
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receipt and distribution of shared savings payments and a "leadership
and management structure that includes clinical and administrative
systems."7" The ACO must also agree to participate in the program
for at least three years and have sufficient primary care capacity to
care for the minimum five thousand Medicare beneficiaries that will
be assigned to it.73 With regard to quality, ACOs must adopt
"processes to promote evidence-based medicine," to use new
technologies to coordinate care and monitor patients, and to satisfy
"patient-centeredness criteria."74 Finally, "[t]he ACO shall be willing
to become accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care" of the
beneficiaries assigned to it.75 To that end, the ACO must develop and
implement quality and cost reporting processes and must provide
feedback on the implementation of those processes to CMS.76
The statutory payment structure largely follows the original
payment reform recommendations for ACOs. Under the statute,
ACOs are eligible to receive two payments from Medicare. First,
"payments shall continue to be made to providers of services and
suppliers participating in an ACO... under Parts A and B ... in the
same manner as they would otherwise be made."77 Therefore,
hospital ACO participants will be reimbursed under the Medicare
Part A prospective payment system, while other ACO providers will
be reimbursed under the Part B fee-for-service payment system.
Second, ACO participants will receive an annual shared savings
payment if two criteria are satisfied: (1) "the ACO meets quality
performance standards established by [CMS]" and (2) the risk-
adjusted per capita expenditures for the ACO's assigned beneficiaries
are a certain percentage below a benchmark determined by CMS."8
The benchmark will be specific to each ACO and will be adjusted for
the characteristics of the beneficiaries assigned to it.79 The shared
savings payment will be a percentage, determined by CMS, of the
total savings generated by the ACO relative to the preestablished
benchmark.8' Thus, regardless of whether participants qualify for the
shared savings payment, they will still be no worse off than they
72. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(C), (F).
73. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(B), (D).
74. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(G)-(H).
75. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(A).
76. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(G).
77. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(A).
78. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(A)-(B).
79. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(B)(ii).
80. § 1395jjj(d)(2).
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would have been if they had not participated in the program, since
they will still receive their fee-for-service or prospective payment.
C. Regulatory Framework
CMS' Rule8" implementing the Shared Savings Program provides
clarity on a number of key aspects of the program. The Rule departs
in a number of important ways from the agency's proposed rule,'
which had been subject to substantial criticism from prospective ACO
participants and other industry stakeholders as being overly
proscriptive and unduly burdensome.83 While the Rule fills in
numerous statutory gaps by addressing a wide variety of issues such
as quality measures, beneficiary assignment, marketing, and use of
health information technology, four policies set forth in the document
are particularly relevant to antitrust review of ACOs.
First, the Rule requires that ACOs adopt a leadership and
management structure that facilitates clinical integration and ensures
ACOs lead to quality and efficiency improvements. 84 In particular,
ACO participants must demonstrate a "meaningful commitment" to
clinical integration by, for example, making substantial financial
investments in the ACO or expending substantial time and effort in
overseeing the ongoing operations of the ACO. 85 ACOs must also
develop evidence-based clinical guidelines and processes for
evaluating participants' adherence to those guidelines.86 Furthermore,
ACOs must implement remedial measures, including the potential for
expulsion, to deal with participants who fail to adhere to guidelines.87
CMS emphasizes that these requirements are intended to harmonize
Shared Savings Program participation requirements with antitrust
81. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg.
67,802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425) [hereinafter Rule].
82. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg.
19,527 (proposed Apr. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425) [hereinafter Proposed
Rule]. CMS drafted the proposed and final rules in conjunction with FTC and DOJ. See id.
at 19,534.
83. See, e.g., Letter from Delos M. Cosgrove, CEO, Cleveland Clinic, to Donald M.
Berwick, Adm'r, CMS 1 (May 26, 2011), available at http://www.medcitynews.com
/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Cleveland-Clinic-ACO-letter.pdf ("[A]fter reviewing [the
Proposed Rule], we are disappointed generally with its content."). In particular, Cosgrove,
CEO of the Cleveland Clinic, said "the Proposed Rule is replete with (1) prescriptive
requirements that have little to do with outcomes, and (2) many detailed governance and
reporting requirements that create significant administrative burdens." Id. at 1.
84. Rule, supra note 81, at 67,976.
85. Id. at 67,824-25, 67,976.
86. Id. at 67,976.
87. Id.
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enforcement policies by incorporating many of the criteria FTC and
DOJ focus on in antitrust review of health care provider networks.88
Second, during the first three years of the program, prospective
ACOs must agree to contract with CMS under one of two payment
tracks. In order to understand the difference between the two tracks,
it is first necessary to distinguish between one-sided and two-sided
risk-sharing payment structures. In a one-sided financial risk-sharing
system, the provider benefits from any decreases in expenditure for a
covered patient population, but is not liable for any increases in
expenditures.8 9 As noted above, the original ACO concept relied on a
shared savings system, which is a form of one-sided risk sharing.90
However, under a two-sided, or "symmetric," risk-sharing system, the
provider benefits from any cost savings, but is also at least somewhat
at risk for any excess expenditures.9 ACOs that opt for payment
Track 1 would engage only in one-sided risk sharing during the three-
year contract, sharing in any savings if realized expenditures were less
than a predetermined target, but not being held liable for losses if
realized expenditures were to exceed the target.92 This is a significant
change from the proposed rule, under which entities choosing Track 1
were required to switch to a two-sided risk-sharing payment model
for the third year of the contract.9" ACOs that select payment Track 2
would agree to engage in two-sided risk sharing during all three years
of the contract. 94 In return for bearing greater risk, ACOs that choose
Track 2 are also eligible to share in a higher proportion of any savings
accruing to Medicare. 95 ACOs contracting under Track 1 during the
first three years of the program must shift to the two-sided model in
future contract periods.96
88. See id. at 67,824 ("[T]he purposes of the Shared Savings Program and the
Antitrust Agencies' clinical integration requirements are complementary and, indeed,
mutually reinforcing."); see also Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 19,542 ("It is in the
public interest to harmonize the eligibility criteria for ACOs that wish to participate in the
Shared Savings Program with the similar antitrust criteria on clinical integration.").
89. See McClellan et al., supra note 13, at 984.
90. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
91. See McClellan et al., supra note 13, at 984.
92. Rule, supra note 81, at 67,985-86.
93. Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 19,603.
94. Rule, supra note 81, at 67,985.
95. Id. at 67,986-87 (providing that ACOs participating in the one-sided model may
"receive shared savings payments of up to 50 percent of all savings" relative to the
benchmark, while ACOs participating in the two-sided model may receive payment may
"receive shared savings payments of up to 60 percent of all savings" relative to the
benchmark).
96. Id. at 67,985.
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Third, primary care physicians who wish to participate in the
Shared Savings Program may only be a member of one ACO.97 For
purposes of this requirement, the term "primary care physicians"
includes "physicians with a designation of internal medicine, geriatric
medicine, family practice and general practice."98 The main reason for
this primary care exclusivity requirement is that CMS will assign
beneficiaries to the ACO from which they receive the plurality of
their primary care services. 99
Finally, the Rule recommends that ACOs that "may present
competitive issues" voluntarily request antitrust review by FTC or
DOJ before participating in the program."l° This also represents a
significant change from the proposed rule, which would have required
that prospective ACOs holding a market share exceeding fifty
percent submit, as a condition for participating in the Shared Savings
Program, a letter from FTC or DOJ stating that neither agency
intends to challenge the proposed ACO.1°1 In the final Rule, CMS
does not provide guidance on what particular market share level
would present sufficient competitive concerns to warrant preliminary
antitrust review. However, in the proposed rule, CMS suggested that
ACOs with market shares exceeding thirty percent for any service
provided by two or more participants in the ACO consider seeking
antitrust clearance by FTC and DOJ or implement conduct
restrictions to minimize competitive concerns."° CMS elected to drop
the antitrust preclearance requirement in the final rule in part due to
concerns expressed by stakeholders 03 that the agency's authority
under the Social Security Act and PPACA is insufficiently broad to
allow the agency to participate in antitrust enforcement. 104
97. Id. at 67,811. Because CMS will identify ACO physician participants using tax
identification numbers, it is possible that the limited group of primary care physician who
bill under two tax identification numbers will be able to participate in more than one
ACO. Id. at 67,810-11.
98. Id. at 67,975.
99. Id. at 67,810-11.
100. Id. at 67,842.
101. Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 19,629.
102. Id. For purposes of this recommendation, market share is calculated using ACO
participants' primary service areas ("PSA"). For a more extensive discussion of the use of
PSAs in calculating market share, see infra Part II.C.
103. Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass'n, to Donald M.
Berwick, Adm'r, CMS, Christine Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., DOJ, & Jon Leibowitz,
Chairman, FTC 7 (May 31, 2011), available at http://www.aha.org/aha/letter/2011/113105-
let-pollack-doj-ftc-hhs.pdf.
104. Rule, supra note 81, at 67,841.
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D. Existing Models
Commentators have identified five existing types of practice
arrangements-ranging from highly vertically and horizontally
integrated delivery entities to coalitions of geographically dispersed
independent physicians-that could serve as models for Medicare
ACOs.'0 ' Many of these models were also tested as part of the
Physician Group Practice demonstration project. 106 On one end of the
spectrum are integrated delivery systems, in which hospitals,
physician practices, and even insurance plans are owned by a single
entity."7 These organizations are generally highly financially and
clinically integrated, using electronic health records, practice
guidelines, and other tools to supply cost-effective, coordinated
care. 108
A second ACO model, multispecialty physician group practices,
are highly clinically integrated organizations with member providers
often using common electronic health record technology and
adhering to jointly established treatment guidelines. 9 These entities
typically employ a variety of mechanisms to provide coordinated,
efficient care and include physicians, physician groups, and
hospitals. 110 Multispecialty physician group practices differ from
integrated delivery systems in that they generally do not own or have
a close affiliation with an insurance plan, but instead contract with
multiple local insurance carriers.'
Physician-hospital organizations ("PHOs"), which are
partnerships between independent physicians or physician groups and
at least one hospital, are a third potential model for ACOs. u2 PHOs
105. Shortell et al., supra note 18, at 1294-95; see infra Table 1.
106. The demonstration project included ten participants with a variety of types of
organizational structures including "free-standing physician groups, academic faculty
practices, integrated delivery systems, and a network of small physician practices."
Iglehart, supra note 66, at 198. The program had mixed success, with half of the
participants receiving a bonus payment during at least one of the project's four years. Id.
at 199.
107. Shortell et al., supra note 18, at 1294. Staff model HMOs such as Kaiser
Permanente and Group Health Cooperative are examples of integrated delivery systems.
Id.
108. Id.
109. See Stephen M. Shortell & Lawrence P. Casalino, Health Care Reform Requires
Accountable Care Systems, 300 JAMA 95,95-96 (2008).
110. Shortell et al., supra note 18, at 1294-95. Examples of multispecialty physician
group practices include Mayo Clinic and The Cleveland Clinic. Id. at 1294.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1295. Advocate Health Care is one example of a PHO. Id. For a discussion
of Advocate Health Care as a model for ACOs, see Mark C. Shields et al., A Model for
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were first widely established in the 1990s in order to give providers
more leverage in negotiating payment rates with managed care plans,
allow providers to directly negotiate with self-insured employers, and
better coordinate care.11 3 However, PHOs waned in popularity as
patient demand for broad provider networks limited insurers'
negotiating leverage."' Generally, PHO is a separate legal entity,
managed by a board of directors composed of physician and hospital
representatives of member organizations and empowered to enter
into contracts on behalf of its members." 5 Because the members
remain independent, PHOs generally "entail[] relatively little clinical
integration among participants,""' 6 although some PHOs involve
significantly greater clinical integration." 7
Independent practice associations ("IPAs"), which also became
popular in the 1990s during the rise of managed care, act as
intermediaries between independent physicians and health insurers. 118
While IPAs can take on a broad variety of structures, most IPAs fall
into one of two primary models. In the first model the IPA acts as a
payment negotiating organization, communicating offers between
insurers and individual physicians and, in some cases, entering into
contracts on the physicians' behalf."9 In the second model the IPA
continues to serve as a negotiating and contracting agent, but also
facilitates administrative and clinical integration of member
practices. l0 Regardless of which model is used, IPAs are often, but
Integrating Independent Physicians into Accountable Care Organizations, 30 HEALTH AFF.
161 passim (2011).
113. See Tricia A. Shackelford, Physician-Hospital Organizations: A U.S. Trend and
Overview, 12 HEALTH L. 24, 24 (2000).
114. See Fisher et al., supra note 1, at w54.
115. Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems and
Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1519 (1994); Julie Y. Park, Comment, PHOs and the
1996 Federal Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines: Ensuring the Formation of Procompetitive
Multiprovider Networks, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1684, 1692-94 (1997).
116. Greaney, supra note 115, at 1519.
117. See Shortell et al., supra note 18, at 1295.
118. Gregory D. Adams & Fred S. McChesney, Not Good Enough for Government
Work: Geographic Market Definition and the FTC's Case Against Chicagoland Physician
Associations, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 771, 775 (2010). One example of an IPA with
a high level of clinical integration is Hill Physicians Group in Northern California. Shortell
et al., supra note 18, at 1295.
119. See PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 31-33,
73-74 (5th ed. 2007).
120. Id. at 74.
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not always, affiliated with a particular hospital or hospital network 121
and can involve varying degrees of clinical integration. 122
On the least integrated end of the spectrum are virtual physician
organizations. These networks of independent practices, often located
in rural areas, invest in infrastructure that thereby facilitates the
provision of coordinated and cost-effective care. 123 One widely cited
example of a virtual physician organization is Community Care of
North Carolina,124 which provides care primarily for Medicaid
patients through a group of local networks of independent
physicians. 125  Virtual physician organizations are viewed as a
promising avenue for bringing more coordinated care to areas where
the provider market is currently highly fragmented. 126
121. Adams & McChesney, supra note 118, at 775.
122. Cf Shortell et al., supra note 18, at 1295 ("[IPAs] consist of individual physician
practices that came together largely for purposes of contracting with health plans. Over
time, however, many of these have evolved into more-organized networks of practices that
are actively engaged in practice redesign, quality improvement initiatives, and
implementation of electronic health records.").
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., id.
125. See L. Allen Dobson, Jr., Community Care of North Carolina: An Enhanced
Medical Home Model, 70 N.C. MED. J. 219,220 (2009).
126. See AM. MED. ASW'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATION (ACO) PRINCIPLES (2010), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal
/pub/upload/mm/399/aco-principles.pdf.
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Table 1: Existing Practice Arrangements that are Models for A COs
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II. THE COMPETITIVE FRAMEWORK FOR HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS
The preceding section demonstrates that ACOs are intended to
be networks of providers designed to improve quality and efficiency
by strengthening coordination between their members, particularly
physicians and hospitals. While the statute and Rule place some
constraints on how ACOs must be organized, there is still a broad
variety of practice arrangements that have been identified as possible
V 1 Mal
physician
organization
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models for ACOs. This large number of potential structures also
makes it difficult for antitrust regulators to establish a single
enforcement policy for ACOs since different types of ACOs may
raise different antitrust concerns.
Three documents are particularly relevant to antitrust review of
ACOs: (1) Section 1 of the Sherman Act; (2) FTC and DOJ's
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care
("Guidelines"); and (3) FTC and DOJ's Statement of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program ("ACO
Statement"). Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which outlaws concerted
acts by competitors to restrain competition, is the primary antitrust
statute relevant to health care provider joint ventures. 127 The
Sherman Act is criminally enforced by DOJ and civilly enforced by
DOJ, FTC, and private litigants. As noted above, DOJ and FTC
jointly issued the Guidelines, which outline the agencies' enforcement
policies for provider joint ventures. FTC has further clarified the
Guidelines through a number of advisory opinions regarding
proposed health care provider joint ventures.128
A. The Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce. ' 129 As the statutory language
suggests, a party seeking to establish a claim under Section 1 must
first prove the existence of a concerted action to restrain trade by
distinct economic entities.13 With joint ventures, a key question is
whether the venture should be treated as a single economic entity,
and thus not subject to Sherman Act liability, or a concerted act by
competitors."' The Supreme Court recently held in American Needle,
Inc. v. National Football League132 that in making such a
127. Taylor Burke & Sara Rosenbaum, Aligning Health Care Market Incentives in an
Information Age: The Role of Antitrust Law, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 151, 166
(2009).
128. For a topical list of FTC's health care sector advisory opinions, see generally
HEALTH CARE Div., FED. TRADE COMM'N, TOPIC AND YEARLY INDICES OF HEALTH
CARE ANTITRUST ADVISORY OPINIONS BY COMMISSION AND STAFF (2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov
/bc/adops/indexfin062010.pdf.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
130. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010).
131. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982).
132. 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
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determination, "[t]he relevant inquiry... is whether there is a
'contract, combination.., or conspiracy' amongst 'separate economic
actors pursuing separate economic interests'... such that the
agreement 'deprives the marketplace of independent centers of
decisionmaking.' "133 In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society,"M which dealt with a joint venture among physicians, the
Court said "joint arrangements in which persons who would
otherwise be competitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss
as well as the opportunities for profit" should be treated as single
entities and not subject to the Sherman Act,'35 demonstrating that
financial risk sharing is a critical component in determining whether a
joint venture should be immune from Sherman liability.
If Section 1 is found to be applicable, a court must then
determine whether the arrangement is either per se illegal or should
be analyzed under the so-called "rule of reason." While the plain
language of Section 1 would seem to outlaw all agreements that
restrain trade, beginning with Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States,'36  the Court has consistently held that only
"unreasonable" restraints on trade violate the Sherman Act.'37 In
applying this rule of reason, the factfinder must "decide whether
under all the circumstances of the case the restrictive practice imposes
an unreasonable restraint on competition."' 38 This analysis requires a
balancing of the anticompetitive effects of an agreement against any
procompetitive justifications.'39 Under the rule of reason, the plaintiff
first bears the burden of demonstrating anticompetitive effects
resulting from the concerted activity, which the defendant can then
rebut by showing superseding procompetitive benefits. 140 The initial
showing of anticompetitive effects can be an expensive, time-
consuming process, requiring a court to weigh voluminous
133. Id. at 2212 (internal citations omitted).
134. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
135. Id. at 356.
136. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
137. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343; Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 59-60. Prior to the Standard
Oil decision, the Court interpreted Section 1 according to its plain meaning. See Maurice
E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375,
1389-92 (2009).
138. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343.
139. One of the earliest formulations of this test was put forth by Justice Brandeis in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, stating that the "test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918).
140. Stucke, supra note 137, at 1385.
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information regarding the relevant product and geographic markets
as well as complex economic analyses from both parties' experts.141
For these reasons, scholars often criticize the rule of reason. 142
Plaintiffs' attorneys and some scholars have also decried the rule of
reason review as a de facto rubber stamp for defendants. 43
In an effort to deal with these concerns as well as skepticism over
courts' competency to deal with complex economic issues,'" the
Court has identified certain practices for which there is an
irrebuttable presumption of anticompetitiveness 45 These "per se"
illegal activities include market allocation agreements,'" bid
147rigging, group boycotts, 148 and, of particular relevance to ACOs,
horizontal price-fixing. 149 Unlike rule of reason analysis, if an activity
is deemed per se illegal, it is irrelevant whether the defendants can
put forth a procompetitive justification for the activity. 5° In
Maricopa, the Supreme Court held that a horizontal agreement
between nonintegrated physicians to set maximum prices constituted
a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 5 Since the late 1970s,
however, the Court has narrowed the applicability of the per se rules
in favor of expanded use of the rule of reason,'52 suggesting that the
Maricopa facts might receive different treatment by the current
Court.
In addition to the two traditional standards of review, FTC, with
at least some encouragement by the courts, has sought to develop a
third standard of review-the "quick-look"-that lies somewhere
between rule of reason and per se analysis.5 3 Under this approach,
certain concerted activities are deemed to be "inherently suspect"
141. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343; see Stucke, supra note 137, at 1384-86.
142. See, e.g., John J. Flynn, The Role of Rules in Antitrust Analysis, 2006 UTAH L.
REV. 605, 634 (2006); Stucke, supra note 137, at 1387.
143. See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 137, at 1384 n.33.
144. Id. at 1399-1407.
145. Burke & Rosenbaum, supra note 127, at 168.
146. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
147. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211,236-38 (1899).
148. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959).
149. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-13 (1940).
150. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) ("The
anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial
invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are offered for some.").
151. Id. at 332.
152. See Stucke, supra note 137, at 1407-10. For example, in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the Supreme Court held that all vertical restraints should be
reviewed under the rule of reason, reversing prior case law treating certain vertical
restraints such as resale price maintenance as per se unlawful. 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
153. See Stucke, supra note 137, at 1410-15.
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and thus presumptively anticompetitive, shifting the initial burden of
proof to defendants to show an arrangement's procompetitive
benefits. 154 However, due to lack of clarity on what activities warrant
quick-look analysis, courts have been hesitant to widely apply the
new test.'55
B. The Guidelines
In the face of substantial restructuring in the health care sector as
a result of the rise of managed care, FTC and DOJ jointly issued the
Guidelines in an effort to give market participants greater clarity
about the agencies' opinion of the applicability of antitrust laws to a
number of provider arrangements.5 6 The agencies updated and
expanded the Guidelines in 1994 and 1996,17 but they have not
revisited them since. While the Guidelines lack binding legal
authority, some courts have viewed them as persuasive. 1 8 The
Guidelines are also important because the vast majority of antitrust
actions against provider networks over the last decade have been
dealt with administratively by FTC, rather than in the courts.'59 The
Guidelines are broken up into nine "Statements." The first seven
statements deal with mergers and joint ventures involving hospitals;
provider provision of fee- and non-fee-related information to health
care services purchasers; provider exchanges of price and cost
information; and joint purchasing arrangements among health care
providers.160 The final two statements, dealing with physician network
joint ventures and multiprovider networks, are particularly relevant
to ACOs.
154. Id. at 1410.
155. Id. at 1413-15. It is important to note, however, that the Fifth Circuit accepted
FTC's use of the quick-look framework in North Texas Specialty Physicians v. FTC, which
involved an FTC challenge to a collective bargaining agreement among physicians. 528
F.3d 346, 359-63 (5th Cir. 2008).
156. Guidelines, supra note 30, at 20,799.
157. Id.
158. See Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1548-49 (11th Cir.
1996); United States v. Health Choice of Nw. Mo., Inc., No. 95-6171-CVSJ6, 1996 WL
773322, at *10-11 nn.4-5 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 22, 1996); United States v. HealthCare Partners,
Inc., No. 395-CV-01946RNC, 1996 WL 193753, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 15, 1996).
159. Following a series of unsuccessful attempts by DOJ to challenge mergers in the
health care sector, in recent years DOJ has been "reluctant" to bring health care antitrust
cases to court. See Greaney, supra note 4, at 231. However, over the same time period,
FTC has not been similarly reticent about bringing administrative antitrust actions against
health care providers. For a list of such actions, see generally HEALTH CARE DIv., FED.
TRADE COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES
AND PRODUCTS (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/110120hcupdate.pdf.
160. Guidelines, supra note 30, at 20,799.
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Statement 8 deals with physician network joint ventures, defined
as "physician-controlled venture[s] in which the network's physician
participants collectively agree on prices or price-related terms and
jointly market their services. '"161 Examples of physician network joint
ventures include IPAs and PPOs.'162 Absent the separate regulations
set out in the ACO Statement, physician-only ACOs would be
analyzed under Statement 8.
Statement 8 sets out a three-part process for assessing whether
an arrangement will be subject to enforcement action by FTC or
DOJ. First, the agencies will determine if the arrangement falls within
one of two "antitrust safety zones."163 The first safety zone covers
"exclusive" networks in which individual physician participants have
little opportunity to affiliate or contract with other physician
networks or health plans. The second safety zone covers non-
exclusive networks where participants are able to affiliate or contract
with other networks or health plans. 164 Statement 8 provides a
number of "indicia of non-exclusivity," such as physician member
participation in other networks or managed care plans and the
presence of other "viable competing networks or managed care
plans" in the market. 165 An exclusive network falls into a safety zone
if all of its physician participants "constitute 20 percent or less of the
physicians in each physician specialty with active hospital staff
privileges in the relevant geographic market.' 1 66 The agencies set a
lower bar for nonexclusive networks, requiring physician participants
constitute no more than thirty percent of the relevant market, as
defined in the particular case. 167
In addition, to qualify for either safety zone, physician
participants in the joint venture must bear "substantial financial risk"
with regard to the services provided by the network. 168 Examples
include capitated payment, as well as bonus-and-withholding
programs tied to quality and cost-containment goals, 169 suggesting
161. Id. at 20,814.
162. Id. For a description of PPOs and IPAs, see supra notes 6, 118-22 and
accompanying text.
163. Guidelines, supra note 30, at 20,815.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 20,815-16.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 20,816. Under capitation, which is the primary mechanism managed care
uses to counteract the incentive for overutilization under fee-for-service, providers are
paid a fixed amount to furnish a defined set of services to a patient or population of
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that some form of two-sided risk sharing is necessary to satisfy the
substantial financial risk requirement. The two-sided risk-sharing
requirement mirrors the standard for treating a joint venture as a
single economic entity for antitrust purposes set out in Maricopa."7 °
Second, if the arrangement does not fall within a safety zone, the
agencies will determine whether the arrangement is per se illegal or
should be analyzed under the rule of reason. In order to avoid per se
treatment, two criteria must be satisfied: (1) the network must involve
"substantial" integration likely to produce procompetitive efficiencies
and (2) joint contracting must be "subordinate and reasonably related
to" achievement of these efficiencies.'71  Integration can be
demonstrated through (a) substantial financial risk sharing or (b)
clinical integration. 7 ' Substantial financial risk sharing, which the
agencies say is a "reliable" indicator of an arrangement's potential to
achieve efficiencies, is defined the same way as it is for the purposes
of the safety zones, requiring two-sided risk sharing.'73 The clinical
integration prong, which was added as part of the 1996 revision to the
Guidelines1 74 and has been the subject of substantial scholarly
debate, 175 also deals with the likelihood of the joint venture to
produce significant procompetitive efficiencies. 176 Clinical integration
can be evidenced by a program that demonstrates
a high degree of interdependence and cooperation among the
[participating] physicians to control costs and ensure quality.
This program may include: (1) establishing mechanisms to
monitor and control utilization of health care services that are
designed to control costs and assure quality of care; (2)
selectively choosing network physicians who are likely to
patients. Robinson, supra note 44, at 149. Since capitated payments do not vary with
services actually provided, providers have an incentive to ration care in order to maximize
the difference between the payment they receive and the costs they incur in providing
care. Id. For a discussion of bonus-and-withhold models, see supra note 64.
170. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
171. See Letter from Markus H. Meier, Assistant Dir., FTC Bureau of Competition
Health Care Div., to Christi J. Braun & John J. Miles, Ober, Kaler, Grimes, & Shriver 1
(Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/adops/gripa.pdf.
172. Guidelines, supra note 30, at 20,817.
173. Id. at 20,816.
174. Scott D. Danzis, Note, Revising the Revised Guidelines: Incentives, Clinically
Integrated Physician Networks, and the Antitrust Laws, 87 VA. L. REV. 531, 533-34 (2001).
175. Compare Burke & Rosenbaum, supra note 127, at 159, 163 (arguing that FTC and
DOJ should offer broader antitrust protection for clinically integrated provider joint
ventures), with Danzis, supra note 174, at 536-37 (recommending that the agencies'
favorable treatment of clinical integration under the revised guidelines be revisited).
176. Guidelines, supra note 30, at 20,817.
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further these efficiency objectives; and (3) the significant
investment of capital, both monetary and human, in the
necessary infrastructure and capability to realize the claimed
efficiencies. 77
The agencies emphasize that other arrangements may also evidence
clinical integration.17
Finally, the agencies lay out a four-part test for applying the rule
of reason in the context of physician network joint ventures. First, the
agencies define the relevant product and geographic markets. 79 The
second step involves an analysis of "the competitive effects of the
physician [network] joint venture."' 180 Third, the agencies balance
potential anticompetitive effects against any procompetitive
efficiencies likely attributable to the joint venture.' In the fourth and
final step, the agencies consider the impact of the arrangement on
collateral agreements by physicians within the network. 182
Physician network joint ventures are a subset of the
arrangements covered by Statement 9, which deals with multiprovider
networks.'83 As their name suggests, multiprovider networks differ
from physician network joint ventures in that they can include non-
physician providers such as hospitals and dentists. 84 Therefore, in the
absence of the ACO Statement, ACOs that include hospitals would
be reviewed under Statement 9.
Unlike with physician network joint ventures, Statement 9 does
not establish antitrust safety zones for multiprovider networks. The
agencies explain that "[b]ecause multiprovider networks involve a
large variety of structures and relationships among many different
types of health care providers, and new arrangements are continually
developing, the Agencies are unable to establish a meaningful safety
zone for these entities." '
Given this lack of a safety zone, the key antitrust determination
for multiprovider networks is whether the entity is per se illegal or
should be analyzed under the rule of reason. Multiprovider networks
that exhibit (1) substantial integration-clinical or financial-and (2)
177. Id.
178. Id. at 20,817, 20,819.
179. Id. at 20,818.
180. Id. at 20,818-19.
181. Id. at 20,819.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 20,826 n.44.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 20,826.
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demonstrate that joint negotiation is reasonably necessary to achieve
this integration warrant rule of reason analysis. 186 As was the case for
physician network joint ventures, substantial financial risk sharing
exists if participants bear two-sided financial risk.a87 Statement 9 uses
more general language than Statement 8 regarding what constitutes
clinical integration, stating that as a result of the wide variety of
multiprovider networks no specific guidance on clinical integration is
possible. 188 Furthermore, "[t]he Agencies will consider the particular
nature of the services provided by the network in assessing whether
the network has the potential for producing efficiencies that warrant
rule of reason treatment."' 189
The three-step rule of reason analysis for multiprovider
organizations differs from the rule of reason analysis for physician
network joint ventures in that it considers the competitive impact of
both horizontal and vertical restraints. First, the agencies define the
relevant product and geographic markets. 190  This process is
substantially more complex for multiprovider networks than
physician-only networks, requiring analysis of the individual services
provided by the network, such as particular physician-member
specialties and hospital services, as well as the market for the network
itself.' The second step, competitive analysis, is broken up into three
prongs: (a) horizontal analysis, (b) vertical analysis, and (c) analysis
of the potential impact of exclusion of particular providers or classes
of providers. 9 2 The horizontal analysis prong is similar to the
competitive effects analysis for physician network joint ventures,
examining the network's market share in each area serviced by the
network (which may include, among others, hospital services,
individual physician specialties, primary care).' 9' The vertical analysis
186. See Letter from David R. Pender, Acting Assistant. Dir., FTC Bureau of
Competition Health Care Servs. & Prods. Div., to Clifton E. Johnson & William H.
Thompson, Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman 3 (Mar. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/SuburbanHealthOrganizationStaffAdvisoryOpinion328200
6.pdf (explaining per se treatment of joint price negotiation by members of PHO would
only be avoided "if the competitive restraints were determined to be 'ancillary' to-i.e.,
related and subordinate to, and reasonably necessary to achieve the efficiencies of-some
primary, potentially efficiency-enhancing economic integration among the joint venture's
participants").
187. Guidelines, supra note 30, at 20,827.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 20,828.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 20,828-30.
193. Id. at 20,828-29.
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prong is designed to assess whether one network participant's market
power will have anticompetitive effects in the relevant markets for
other network participants.'94 The final step involves a balancing of
anticompetitive effects against any procompetitive efficiencies.'95
C. The Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy for ACOs
The ACO Statement, which outlines antitrust enforcement policy
for commercial ACOs that also participate in the Shared Savings
Program, incorporates many of the concepts outlined in the
Guidelines, but it also differs in certain key ways. As many observers
expected,' 96 an ACO that "meets CMS's eligibility requirements for,
and participates in, the Shared Savings Program and uses the same
governance and leadership structures and clinical and administrative
processes it uses in the Shared Savings Program to serve patients in
commercial markets" will be subject to rule of reason treatment. 197
The ACO Statement says that the rule of reason is appropriate
because CMS' proposed eligibility criteria for Medicare ACOs are
"broadly consistent with the indicia of clinical integration.., set forth
in the [Guidelines]."'' 98 Moreover, the clinical integration required to
participate in the Medicare ACO program is sufficiently robust that
the agencies "will treat joint negotiations with private payers as
reasonably necessary to an ACO's primary purpose of improving
health care delivery.' 1 99
The level of scrutiny that a commercial ACO satisfying the
Shared Savings Program participation criteria will receive depends on
the ACO's share of its participant's primary service areas ("PSA"). 2
194. Id. at 20,829-30.
195. Id. at 20,830.
196. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Chester A. Myers Professor & Co-Dir. of the Ctr.
for Health Care Studies at Saint Louis Univ. Sch. of Law, Comments to the Workshop
Regarding Accountable Care Organizations and Implications Regarding Antitrust,
Physicians Self-Referral, Anti-Kickback and Civil Monetary Penalty Laws 1 (Sept. 27,
2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco/100927greaney.pdf ("[T]he
requirements of the Shared Savings Program closely parallel the standard for meaningful
clinical integration under antitrust law.").
197. ACO Statement, supra note 24, at 67,028.
198. Id. at 67,027.
199. Id. at 67,028.
200. PSAs are not a new concept; CMS first introduced PSAs in the second phase of its
regulations implementing the physician self-referral, or "Stark" law, which prohibits
physicians from making referrals to entities with which they have a financial relationship.
See Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,894,
21,899 n.42 (Apr. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Proposed Statement].
[Vol. 90
2011] ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 233
The ACO Statement defines a PSA "as the lowest number of postal
zip codes from which [an ACO] participant draws at least 75 percent
of its patients.""2 1 While noting that PSAs do not constitute a formal
geographic market, the agencies state that PSAs are a useful tool to
gauge the competitive risk posed by an ACO.2°
PSAs are calculated in a three-step process. First, the agencies
will identify each service offered by a least two independent
participants in the ACO.2 3 For physicians, a service is defined as the
physician participant's primary specialty.2°4 For inpatient and
outpatient treatment facilities, service lines are defined using
preexisting CMS billing categories such as cardiac care or
musculoskeletal procedures.0 5 Second, the agencies will determine
the PSA for each service offered by two or more participants in the
ACO. 2 6 Third, the agencies will calculate the ACO's share in each
PSA for each service offered by more than two participants in the
ACO.20 7 PSA shares for physician services are calculated by looking
at the total Medicare fee-for-service allowed charges.20 8 Outpatient
service shares are calculated using Medicare fee-for-service payments
during the most recent calendar year, and inpatient service shares are
calculated using state-level all-payer hospital discharge data. 209
Depending on its PSA shares, an ACO will fall into one of two
antitrust review categories. ACOs that have PSA shares thirty
percent or less for each service provided by two or more ACO
participants will fall into a safety zone and will not be scrutinized by
FTC or DOJ. 21° Importantly, in order for an ACO to qualify for the
safety zone, hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers must be
nonexclusive to the ACO, regardless of PSA share. 211  The
201. ACO Statement, supra note 24, at 67,031.
202. Id. at 67,028.
203. Id. at 67,031.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. One potential drawback to using Medicare claims information to calculate
PSA shares for physician and outpatient services is that there are likely geographic
consumption differences between the Medicare and non-Medicare populations. For
example, Medicare patients, who are older, may be less willing to travel long distances to
access health care services than non-Medicare patients. Moreover, share information may
also be skewed by the fact that Medicare patients use a different mix of services than non-
Medicare patients. See Judith R. Lave et al., Costing Medical Care: Using Medicare
Administrative Data, 32 MED. CARE (Supp.) JS77, JS80 (1994).
210. ACO Statement, supra note 24, at 67,028.
211. Id. at 67,028-29.
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nonexclusivity requirement means that hospital and ambulatory
surgical center ACO participants must retain the right to contract
with payers independently or through another provider group or
ACO.212 The ACO Statement notes that "the indicia of non-
exclusivity" set out in the Guidelines will be used to determine
whether an ACO participant is in fact nonexclusive. 213  By
comparison, the Shared Savings Program Rule requires primary care
ACO participants to be exclusive to one ACO.2 14
ACOs with PSA shares exceeding thirty percent in some service
areas will be subject to standard rule of reason review, with the
agencies bringing an antitrust enforcement action if the ACO's
anticompetitive effects exceed its potential to generate efficiencies.215
The ACO Statement identifies four particular types of conduct that
will warrant scrutiny for ACOs in this category: (1) preventing payers
from incentivizing enrollees to choose certain providers; (2) tying
sales of ACO services to purchase of services of affiliated providers
outside the ACO; (3) exclusive contracting among ACO participants,
with the exception of primary care physicians; and (4) restricting a
payer's ability to make cost, quality, and efficiency data available to
its enrollees.216 The agencies also note that regardless of PSA share,
ACOs should not share competitively sensitive information such as
pricing data among their members.217
212. Id. at 67,028.
213. Id. at 67,028 n.30.
214. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
215. ACO Statement, supra note 24, at 67,027, 67,029.
216. Id. at 67,029-30.
217. Id. at 67,029.
[Vol. 90
2011] ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 235
Table 2: Antitrust Review Standards for Provider Networks under the
Guidelines and for Accountable Care Organizations under the ACO
Statement
Kequirements ror tinical mtegrauon or
receiving rule of reason financial integration
review
5alsracuon or ivieaicare
Shared Savings Program
participation
requirements
3aeLy zone ior pnysician- iNo I es, III auuItiuon to
hospital networks satisfying physician ACO
safety zone requirements,
hospital members must
be non-exclusive to the
A C-'C"
III. ASSESSING WHETHER HOSPITAL ACOs SHOULD FACE
HEIGHTENED ANTITRUST REVIEW
As the analysis in Part II demonstrates, the antitrust enforcement
environment for provider networks participating in the Shared
Savings Program is significantly less burdensome under the ACO
Statement than the Guidelines.21 For example, in order to qualify for
the physician-network joint venture safety zone under the Guidelines,
physician networks must engage in two-sided financial risk sharing-a
requirement not present under the ACO Statement. Similarly,
218. See supra Table 2 (comparing key provisions of the Guidelines, supra note 30, and
the ACO Statement, supra note 24).
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exclusive physician-only ACOs are subject to a more relaxed
enforcement environment under the ACO Statement, facing a thirty
percent market share cap to qualify for the safety zone, rather than
the twenty percent share cap under the Guidelines.
FFC and DOJ's less rigorous approach to antitrust enforcement
is particularly apparent in the context of hospital ACOs-the focus of
this Comment. Whereas the Guidelines do not include an antitrust
safety zone for provider networks that include hospitals, the ACO
Statement does provide one. With the exception of the nonexclusivity
requirement for hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers, the
conditions for qualifying for the safety zone are equivalent for
physician-only ACOs and hospital ACOs. While this Comment
applauds FTC and DOJ's decision to extend the safety zone to ACOs
that include hospitals, it also argues that the conditions for qualifying
for the safety zone are insufficiently robust to address the unique
competitive risks posed by hospital ACOs relative to physician
ACOs. In particular, hospital ACOs should be required to engage in
two-sided financial risk sharing in order to qualify for the safety zone.
This added requirement is necessary to ensure that hospital ACOs
consistently drive sufficient efficiencies to outweigh potential
competitive harms associated with joint price negotiation.
Before arguing that FTC and DOJ have gone too far in relaxing
their antitrust review standards for hospital ACOs, it is useful to
consider some arguments for and against heightened antitrust review
standards for ACOs that include hospitals.
A. Reasons for Establishing Higher Antitrust Barriers for Hospital
ACOs
One reason ACOs that include hospitals pose greater
competitive risk and thus warrant differential treatment is that the
hospital market is generally far more concentrated than other
provider markets. 219 In response to reimbursement pressures
accompanying the rise of managed care, more than 900 hospitals
merged between 1994 and 2000.22' This consolidation was only
exacerbated by FTC and DOJ's reluctance to challenge hospital
mergers following a series of failed enforcement efforts.221 As a result
of this wave of consolidation, over ninety percent of the nation's
219. See Greaney, supra note 4, at 231-35.
220. Gaynor, supra note 48.
221. See Greaney, supra note 4, at 231.
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population lived in concentrated hospital markets by 2003.222
Moreover, there are already anecdotal reports that new market
pressures created by PPACA are driving a second wave of
consolidation in the hospital sector. 23 This consolidation has been
shown to have significant anticompetitive effects, with hospitals in
concentrated markets able to negotiate substantial price increases.
224
These adverse price consequences are only exacerbated when the
formation of hospital systems allows the systems to leverage a
"flagship" or "must-have" hospital "to obtain higher payment rates
for all hospitals in the system, including those that would not have
such status as independent hospitals. ' 225 These price increases have
occurred in the absence of evidence of any significant scale economies
or other efficiencies.226  Evidence also suggests that hospital
consolidation has, at best, a neutral impact on quality, and, at worst, a
negative impact on quality. 227
While the hospital market has become highly concentrated, the
physician market has remained largely fragmented. There was a trend
toward consolidation among physicians into large multispecialty
groups and IPAs during the rise of managed care, but the number of
such organizations has been in decline since managed care plans lost
popularity, 228 with physicians shifting into "mid-size, single-specialty
groups." '229 As of 2008, "[t]wo thirds of all physicians.., practice in
222. Id.
223. See Pear, supra note 20; see also Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act
and Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo?, 89 OR. L. REV. 811, 844 (2011) ("[Tlhe
path of ACO development could prove profoundly anticompetitive. One concern flows
from what might come to be called the '2010 Health Reform Merger Wave'-a rush to
consolidation induced in part by hospitals and physicians wanting to be assured they will
be in a strong bargaining position.").
224. See Berenson et al., supra note 21, at 699, 702; Gaynor, supra note 48 (noting that
price increases due to hospital consolidation range from five percent to fifty percent
depending on the level of concentration in the market). See generally Martin Gaynor &
Deborah Haas-Wilson, Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets,
13 J. ECON. PERSP. 141, 152 (1999) (reviewing the economic literature on the price and
quality consequences of hospital consolidation); William B. Vogt & Robert Town, How
Has Hospital Consolidation Affected the Price and Quality of Hospital Care?, Research
Synthesis Report No. 9, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Feb. 2006), http://www.rwjf
.org/pr/synthesis/reportsand-briefs/pdf/no9_researchreport.pdf (assessing the likely
effects of hospital consolidation on prices, costs, and quality of healthcare).
225. Berenson et al., supra note 21, at 702.
226. Greaney, supra note 4, at 231.
227. Gaynor, supra note 48 (stating that evidence regarding the impact of consolidation
on quality is "less firm than for price," but "[o]n balance, evidence suggests consolidation
lowers quality").
228. Casalino, supra note 7, at 573.
229. Greaney, supra note 4, at 234.
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groups of fifty or fewer, and one-third work either solo or in a
practice of two. ' 230  Commentators attribute this continuing
fragmentation to uncertainty over the legal viability of nonrisk-
bearing clinically integrated networks, lack of financial incentives to
spur integration, the desire of physicians to maintain their
independence, 231 and market failures in the health care delivery
system.232
A second reason hospital ACOs raise more competitive concerns
than physician ACOs is that there would be less horizontal
competition in the provider market if hospitals and physicians jointly
form ACOs. Historically, there was little direct competition between
hospitals and physicians, with hospitals acting as the "workshop"
where physicians practiced.233 However, in recent years, direct
competition between hospitals and physicians has become far more
prevalent.2 34 Hospitals have entered into the physician services
market through the purchase of physician practices.235 Similarly,
physicians have entered into product areas traditionally controlled by
hospitals through the development of physician-owned diagnostic and
ambulatory surgical centers. 236  This trend toward increased
competition between physicians and hospitals, which could be
reversed if physicians and hospitals jointly form ACOs, positively
affects cost and quality.237 FTC's recent challenge of the hospital
system Carilion Clinic's acquisition of physician-owned outpatient
imaging and surgical centers indicates that the agency is concerned by
230. Burke & Rosenbaum, supra note 127, at 153-54.
231. Casalino, supra note 7, at 573-75.
232. See Greaney, supra note 223, at 817-20. For example, information asymmetries
between providers and patients make it difficult for patients to factor quality into their
health care consumption decisions, limiting quality competition between providers. Were
providers to compete on quality, there would be a market incentive to collaborate to
improve care.
233. See James F. Blumstein, Of Doctors and Hospitals: Setting the Analytical
Framework for Managing and Regulating the Relationship, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 211,
213 (2007).
234. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
235. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 33.
236. See id. at 34.
237. See, e.g., Complaint at 6, Carilion Clinic, F.T.C. File No. 081-0259 (July 23, 2009),
2009 WL 2251279 at *5, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9338
/090724carilioncmpt.pdf ("[Clompetition from [physician-owned imaging and surgical
centers] spurred [hospital system] Carilion to improve the quality, services, and amenities
at its own outpatient facilities, to the benefit of consumers .... ").
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agreements that curtail this trend toward increased direct competition
between hospitals and physicians.238
Third, hospital ACOs deserve heightened antitrust scrutiny due
to the unique concerns posed by vertical integration. Vertical analysis
is necessary when hospital-physician ventures cover services in
practice areas in which hospitals and physicians generally do not
directly compete, particularly hospital-based services such as
anesthesiology, radiology, and pathology. 39 While antitrust regulators
have traditionally focused more on concerns posed by horizontal
integration,24 vertical integration among providers also raises
substantial competitive issues.241 There is substantial risk that since
the hospital market is more concentrated, and thus less competitive
than the physician market, "doctors may acquire market power by
integrating with a hospital. ' '242 As one payer explains:
[W]e have to be particularly attentive to the circumstances of
markets in which there are dominant hospitals, which are likely
to be the primary sources of aggregation into ACO kinds of
structures.... [T]he potential to have the market forces create
a kind of centrifugal force around hospitals that already have
dominant market positions, where the impact of further
aggregation and the aggregation of physicians and other kinds
of entities, into a single entity around those hospitals.., in the
commercial market, that is a terrible threat.243
In fact, there is already anecdotal evidence from California of
physicians leveraging hospitals' market power to negotiate higher
reimbursement rates. 244 A second competitive concern with vertical
integration among physicians and hospitals is that more hospitals will
deny privileges to physicians with whom they are not aligned. 245 This
denial of privileges could deter entry of competitor ACOs,
238. See id. at *7. Carilion's acquisition of the physician-owned facilities would have
reduced the number of competitors in the market from three to two. Id. at *5.
239. See Park, supra note 115, at 1702.
240. See id.
241. See Gaynor, supra note 48.
242. Id.
243. Elizabeth Gilbertson, Chief of Strategy, Hotel Emp. & Rest. Emp. Int'l Union,
Remarks at ACO Workshop, supra note 23, at 38.
244. Berenson et al., supra note 21, at 703 (quoting a benefit consultant as stating that
"Sutter [hospital system] has figured out a way to lock physicians into their hospitals to
allow physicians to piggyback on Sutter's negotiating leverage").
245. See Mark L. Mattioli, Can Preventing Diversion of Profitable Patients Justify
Hospitals' Economic Credentialing Under the Antitrust Laws, J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L.,
Apr. 2008, at 39, 42-43.
239
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particularly physician-only ACOs. There are a number of theoretical
efficiencies with vertical integration between physicians and hospitals,
including cost and quality improvements through more coordinated
care and reduced transaction costs. However, empirical efforts have
failed to reveal cost savings or quality improvements resulting from
these potential efficiencies in practice.246
A final argument in favor of creating heightened regulatory
barriers for hospital ACOs is that, absent such restrictions, hospitals
will become the dominant players in the provider marketplace.2 47 The
primary reason for this concern is that hospitals' incentives to
maintain inpatient volume may be at odds with the efficiency goals of
ACOs.2 48 This concern was borne out in the results of CMS' Physician
Group Practice demonstration project, where participating entities
closely affiliated with hospitals, though not academic medical centers,
failed to earn performance payments for decreasing expenditures.249
In fact, for the project as a whole, most savings accrued in the
outpatient rather than inpatient settings.25 This may reflect that "the
presence of a hospital was a potential deterrent to achieving
savings.., since these systems may be unable to reduce avoidable
admissions or use lower cost care substitutes without affecting their
inpatient revenue. '' 21 1 A second, related concern is that past hospital
efforts to merge with physicians have "incurred catastrophic
economic losses" due to "inadequate resources and weak
governance.252 If similar losses occur as a result of the move toward
formation of hospital ACOs, a hospital may look to offset these losses
"through horizontal mergers with other hospitals, to become
sufficiently dominant in its market to force private insurers to pay
higher rates not only for the hospital's services but also for those of its
physician employees." 3
246. See Gaynor, supra note 48 (stating that empirical work shows that hospital-
physician integration has "no impact" on costs and "mixed results" on quality).
247. See Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 33-34; see also Lawrence P. Casalino, Livingston
Farrund Professor of Pub. Health & Chief, Div. of Outcomes and Effectiveness Research,
Dep't of Pub. Health, Weill Cornell Med. Coll., Remarks at ACO Workshop, supra note
23, at 74 ("[Tlhere's a lot of reasons to be concerned about a system that would be
basically dominated by hospitals with their physicians employed.").
248. See Shortell et al., supra note 18, at 1294 ("The typical hospital business model
today is based on generating net income from the inpatient margin-in other words, total
payments for inpatient care minus the costs of inpatient treatment.").
249. Iglehart, supra note 66, at 200.
250. Id.
251. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
252. See Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 33-34.
253. Id. at 34.
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B. Reasons for Not Establishing Higher Antitrust Barriers for
Hospital A COs
There are also at least three reasons for not subjecting hospital
ACOs to more stringent antitrust review. Most significantly, hospitals
have access to financial resources and administrative expertise critical
to formation of ACOs. Establishing an ACO will require participants
"to make sizable investments... in consulting services, new
information technology, utilization management tools, and
management support. 2 54 Given the substantial fragmentation in the
physician marketplace, with most physicians continuing to practice
independently or in small groups,255 physicians are unlikely to raise
enough capital to cover the up-front costs required to form an
ACO.256 In addition, establishing and running an ACO will likely
require significant expertise in managing and operating a large
provider system, a skill set that a hospital system is more likely to
have than independent physicians or small physician groups. 57
Consequently, as one observer has noted, "in many communities, the
hospital is the only organized care delivery entity capable of
executing the [ACO] model. ' 258
A second argument against creating a heightened regulatory
standard for hospital ACOs is that hospitals are arguably the most
promising vehicle for generating savings in the health care system.259
There are two primary ways to drive savings in hospital services
expenditures: decreasing the number of hospital admissions (the
extensive margin) and decreasing the costs of care while patients are
in hospitals (the intensive margin). Research suggests that limiting
unnecessary hospital readmissions-when a patient is rehospitalized
soon after being discharged--could save the Medicare program
seventeen billion dollars per year alone. 6° While most care that
254. Id. at 33-34.
255. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
256. The need for substantial up-front investment has been identified as a primary
cause of the slow uptake of health information technology by physicians. Cecil B. Wilson,
President, Am. Med. Ass'n, Remarks at ACO Workshop, supra note 23, at 62.
257. Cf Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Sahni, Physicians Versus Hospitals as Leaders of
Accountable Care Organizations, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2579, 2580 (2010) ("[P]hysicians
have seldom demonstrated the ability to effectively organize themselves into groups, agree
on clinical guidelines, and devise ways to equitably distribute money.").
258. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 33.
259. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
260. Stephen F. Jencks, Mark V. Williams & Eric A. Coleman, Rehospitalizations
Among Patients in the Medicare Fee-for-Service Program, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1418,
1426 (2009).
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prevents readmissions occurs outside of the hospital, hospitals can
still play an important role in preventing readmissions26 by providing
better education to discharged patients and facilitating the smooth
transition of discharged patients to outpatient physicians.262 However,
under the current payment framework, hospitals have little incentive
to take additional steps to prevent readmissions because their
revenue increases with the number of episodes of care. 63 In-hospital
care costs can be reduced by eliminating provision of duplicative
services, such as imaging, and by preventing costly medical errors.26
Shifting to a shared savings payment model will allow hospitals to
capture some of their lost revenue due to less hospital intensive care,
potentially making them more amenable to actively participating in-
or at least not undermining--cost-saving efforts. While physician-only
ACOs may be able to reduce hospital expenditures by limiting
unnecessary admissions, if antitrust entry barriers for hospital ACOs
are set too high, hospitals may try to recoup revenue losses
attributable to physician ACOs by purchasing physician practices,
further enhancing hospitals' market power.2
65
A final reason that hospitals may not warrant differential
treatment is that in certain areas, the market power of hospitals is not
materially different than that of highly sought-after physician
groups.26 While cases where physician groups have equivalent market
261. Id. at 1427.
262. Cf Eric A. Coleman et al., The Care Transitions Intervention: Results of a
Randomized Controlled Trial, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1822, 1826 (2006) (finding
that improved patient discharge instructions and facilitation of patient transition to
outpatient treatment reduces rehospitalizations).
263. Reed Abelson, Hospitals Pay for Cutting Costly Readmissions, N.Y. TIMES, May
9, 2009, at B1.
264. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
265. This risk speaks to the difficult balancing act facing antitrust regulators. If
hospitals are given relatively wide latitude to participate in ACOs, there is an incentive for
additional consolidation among and between hospitals and physicians in order to increase
bargaining leverage. On the other hand, if hospitals are excluded from participation and
face revenue losses due to decreased patient volume, they are likely to merge with other
hospitals or acquire physician groups to make up for these losses through new revenue
streams and higher prices generated through greater bargaining power. For this reason,
one commentator has suggested that further provider consolidation as a result of PPACA
is unavoidable. See Lawrence Casalino, Livingston Farrund Professor of Pub. Health &
Chief, Div. of Outcomes and Effectiveness Research, Dep't of Pub. Health, Weill Cornell
Med. Coll., Remarks at ACO Workshop, supra note 23, at 74 (noting that the move of
physicians into larger provider organizations is "happening very, very quickly and there's
no question that the ACO phenomenon will accelerate that").
266. See Berenson et al., supra note 21, at 703 (citing Brown & Toland and Hill
Physicians as two San Francisco Bay Area IPAs that have substantial market power).
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power to hospitals are in the minority,2 67 it may not make sense to
subject hospitals to more stringent review when their market power is
not materially different than that of certain groups of physicians. A
corollary to this argument is that even if hospitals are unable to
participate in ACOs due to high entry barriers, physician ACOs that
include the vast majority of physicians that practice at a "must-have"
hospital can still leverage the market power of the hospital without
being formally aligned with the hospital.2"
C. Safety Zone Requirements Insufficiently Robust for Hospital
ACOs
The above discussion demonstrates that there are both benefits
and risks to encouraging hospital participation in ACOs. An ideal
antitrust safety zone would mitigate the unique risks with hospital
participation in ACOs without materially undermining any associated
benefits. This Comment argues that while their unique benefits
warrant extension of the antitrust safety zone to hospital ACOs, the
requirements for the safety zone set out in the ACO Statement are
insufficiently robust to address their unique risks.
Before discussing the weaknesses of the safety zone, it is first
worth noting that the current safety zone goes a long way toward
minimizing competitive risks of hospital participation in ACOs. The
market share component, which requires that ACOs have less than a
thirty percent share in each PSA, addresses the hospital market
concentration, horizontal integration, and vertical integration
concerns. Including a market share limitation is necessary to ensure
that ACO participants are unable to exercise substantial market
power. Any ACO market share limitation must balance two
competing interests: ensuring the ACO is large enough to allow for
robust performance measurement while still being small enough to
prevent the ACO from exercising too much market power. ACOs are
statutorily required to have sufficient primary care physicians to
support five thousand beneficiaries. 169 However, depending on what
type of performance measures are used, even larger beneficiary
267. See Robert Galvin, CEO, Equity Healthcare, Remarks at ACO Workshop, supra
note 23, at 66 (stating hospitals are usually the primary cause of price increases, but in
some markets dominant groups of specialists or primary care doctors also have substantial
market power).
268. Cf Berenson et al., supra note 21, at 703 (noting insurers have found that even in
the absence of a formal negotiating structure, "certain physician groups 'look like they are
owned' by hospitals").
269. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(D) (West Supp. 2011).
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populations may be necessary.27 ° On the other hand, it is important
for the safety zone market share cap to be set sufficiently low so that
ACOs are unable to negotiate substantial price increases or deter
entry of competitors. While setting an exact threshold is difficult in
the absence of market experience with ACOs, the thirty percent
threshold used in the ACO Statement, which is in line with the
threshold for nonexclusive physician networks under the Guidelines,
is a reasonable starting point.
Determination of a relevant market requires characterizing both
geographic and product markets. The Supreme Court has defined a
geographic market as the "area of effective competition.., in which
the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn
for supplies. ' 271 As is the case with many industries, regulators and
courts have historically had difficulty defining geographic markets for
health care services, particularly physician and hospital services. 272
The primary advantage of using PSAs, as required by the ACO
Statement, is that PSAs inherently include most reasonable
geographic substitutes for services provided by ACO participants-
those other providers to whom patients could "practicably turn"-
because PSAs reflect all those providers from whom most patients in
a particular area have in fact sought services. The requirement that
ACOs satisfy the market share limitation in each product market also
minimizes vertical integration concerns by preventing ACOs from
leveraging market power in one product market to gain higher
payment rates in other product markets. This will ensure adequate
competition in markets where physicians compete amongst
themselves and where physicians compete with hospitals. Establishing
market share limitations may also prove beneficial in deterring
further consolidation in provider markets because providers will have
270. See Gloria Austin, CEO, Brown & Toland, Remarks at ACO Workshop, supra
note 23, at 63 (stating that ten thousand beneficiaries may be needed for performance
measurement purposes); Lawrence Casalino, Livingston Farrund Professor of Pub. Health
& Chief, Div. of Outcomes and Effectiveness Research, Dep't of Pub. Health, Weill
Cornell Med. Coll., Remarks at ACO Workshop, supra note 23, at 63 (stating that five
thousand beneficiaries would be insufficient for reliable hospital readmissions
measurement).
271. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963) (quoting Tampa Elec.
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)).
272. See Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago's Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in
Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 869-79 (2004) (describing the difficulties of
geographic market analysis in health care); see also Adams & McChesney, supra note 118,
787-90 (recommending a framework for FTC to use in determining the geographic market
for IPAs).
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an incentive to keep their shares below the cap in order to avoid
increasing their antitrust liability risk.
The nonexclusivity requirement, which is the only safety zone
requirement addressing the unique risks posed by hospital ACOs,
also helps mitigate the risks posed by concentration in the hospital
marketplace and concerns related to vertical integration-the
potential for an exclusive hospital member to translate its market
power to other ACO members. ACOs with exclusive hospital
members would have significantly greater market power because
insurers could not contract with the hospitals directly if they felt the
ACO was seeking unreasonable payment rates.273 Exclusivity would
also force insurers to contract with all ACO participants, even if the
insurer only needed access to a specialized service offered by one
member.274 This concern is particularly salient with hospitals given the
large number of specialized services offered and the high degree of
concentration in the hospital sector. Finally, exclusivity can create
barriers to entry of competitor ACOs because an incumbent ACO
may have already reached an exclusive agreement with a provider
that offers a unique and necessary service.
While the market share and nonexclusivity requirements deal
with the concentration, horizontal integration, and vertical
integration concerns, they fail to address the fourth major risk
associated with hospital participation in ACOs: the potential for
ACOs to turn hospitals into the dominant entities in the provider
marketplace. As explained above, the basis of this concern is that
ACOs are primarily expected to generate savings through lowering
hospital services expenditures. Consequently, an ACO in which a
hospital plays a dominant role may lack incentives to pursue cost
savings, since any savings would likely come from the hospital's
bottom line-a concern borne out in the results of the Physician
Group Practice demonstration project.275 This same concern is not
present with physician-only ACOs, since they can drive savings for
their patient population through less hospital care without an
273. See Susan DeSanti, Dir., FTC Office of Policy & Planning, Remarks at ACO
Workshop, supra note 23, at 79-80.
274. Cf. Berenson et al., supra note 21, at 702 (providing examples of hospital systems
using unique services offered by one member medical center to negotiate higher rates for
the entire hospital system).
275. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
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associated decline in the volume of services rendered by their
members.276
Adding a two-sided financial risk-sharing component to the
safety zone for hospital ACOs would effectively address this fourth
concern. Requiring two-sided financial risk sharing is important for
two reasons: (1) it clearly evidences participants' intent to create
efficiencies through integration and (2) it has a demonstrable record
of driving efficiencies through decreased utilization and less hospital
intensive care. With regard to the first reason, two-sided financial risk
sharing is important because, as recognized by the Supreme Court in
Maricopa277 and IFTC and DOJ in the Guidelines,278 it demonstrates
that parties to a joint venture have committed to act as a single
economic agent and thus should be immune from Sherman Act
Section 1 liability. In the context of hospital ACOs, two-sided
financial risk sharing also mitigates concerns about positioning
hospitals as the dominant player in the provider market because it
ensures alignment of hospital and physician utilization incentives,
which, as discussed above, are normally divergent. 79 With the threat
of reimbursement cuts if costs exceed expectations, hospitals would
have a strong incentive to work with physician ACO members to
contain costs.
Two-sided financial risk sharing is also more effective at driving
efficiencies than one-sided risk-sharing payment methods like shared
savings. As explained above, most providers in ACOs will be
primarily reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis-a payment
methodology that can drive providers to overutilize by rendering or
prescribing unnecessary and costly treatment. 20 While less troubling
than pure fee-for-service reimbursement, one-sided risk-sharing
systems are problematic because they raise greater overutilization
concerns than two-sided risk-sharing systems since the lack of
downside risk dulls disincentives against overutilization. 281 This is
because risk-averse individuals "tend to be more concerned about
276. See Kocher & Sahni, supra note 257, at 2582 (predicting that if physicians
"dominate" ACOs, hospitals will have fewer patients and lower revenue).
277. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
280. See Blumstein, supra note 45, at 209.
281. See Saver, supra note 10, at 207; see also Greaney, supra note 196, at 2 ("Looking
at the nation's experience with preferred provider organizations, it is far from clear that
the shared savings bonus model will effectively counteract the volume-increasing
incentives of fee-for-service payment.").
[Vol. 90
2011] ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 247
losing something of value than gaining the equivalent amount. ' 282 For
this reason, it is unlikely that ACOs that only use one-sided risk
sharing will significantly lower health care expenditures because
ACO participants will only restrain their utilization to the extent that
their shared savings payments exceed the expected returns to
overutilization.283 On the other hand, payment systems that involve
two-sided risk sharing, such as capitation and bonus-and-withhold
systems, have been shown in a variety of studies to decrease
utilization and expenditures. 214 For this reason, commentators,
including some of the strongest proponents of ACOs, have suggested
that CMS use regulatory incentives to encourage ACOs to engage in
two-sided financial risk sharing. 85
As explained above, rule of reason review attempts to determine
whether the procompetitive efficiencies generated by a given restraint
outweigh any associated anticompetitive effects.286 In establishing a
safety zone from antitrust enforcement, FTC and DOJ are effectively
determining that the procompetitive benefits of ACOs satisfying the
safety zone requirements presumptively outweigh the harm to
competition associated with allowing ACO members to jointly
negotiate over price. Given that hospital ACOs pose greater risk of
competitive harm than physician-only ACOs, FTC and DOJ should
impose additional safety zone requirements for hospital ACOs in
order to offset the additional risk of competitive harm. As the
agencies say in the ACO Statement, "[t]he greater the likely
anticompetitive effects, the greater the likely efficiencies must be for
the collaboration to pass muster under the antitrust laws. ' 287 With its
282. Saver, supra note 10, at 207.
283. More specifically, a rational provider would only restrain utilization if RL + E[SL]
_ R, where, for a given stream of patients, RL is the provider's reimbursement for a low
utilization level, E[SJ is the provider's expected shared savings payment at the low
utilization level, and R. is the provider's reimbursement for a high utilization level.
284. See Manning et al., supra note 49, at 265-66. See generally Fred J. Hellinger, The
Impact of Financial Incentives on Physician Behavior in Managed Care Plans: A Review of
the Evidence, 53 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 294, 311 (1996) (reviewing the literature on the
impact of managed care on utilization and finding that financial incentives for providers-
primarily capitation-are a "key element" in managed care's success at controlling
utilization).
285. See McClellan et al., supra note 13, at 990 n.5 ("[lit may be advisable to encourage
one-sided bonus models (such as shared savings) that transition over time towards models
with greater accountability for costs and quality."); Shortell et al., supra note 18, at 1295-
96 (recommending that CMS adopt "tiered" payment structure for ACOs, under which
ACOs that bear greater downside risk receive a larger portion of any savings to
Medicare).
286. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
287. ACO Statement, supra note 24, at 67,027.
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demonstrable record of decreasing utilization and expenditures, two-
sided financial risk sharing is precisely such a requirement.
The key outstanding question, then, is whether the addition of a
two-sided financial risk-sharing requirement would materially
undermine the unique benefits of hospital participation in ACOs. The
most significant concern is that the addition of a two-sided risk-
sharing requirement would deter hospitals from participating in the
ACO program and thus deprive prospective ACOs of hospitals'
financial resources and administrative expertise. However, a financial
integration requirement is unlikely to significantly deter hospital
participation in ACOs for at least three reasons. First, hospitals have
experience bearing limited risk under the current prospective
payment system and thus have already implemented clinical and
administrative practices necessary to operate profitably under such
systems.2 88 This experience with risk bearing is a result of one of the
two incentives created by prospective payment. While prospective
payment creates a volume incentive for hospitals on the extensive
margin, it also drives hospitals to control utilization on the intensive
margin because they bear the risk of excess expenditures once a
patient has been admitted. Second, hospitals are in a much stronger
position to bear financial risk than physicians, who remain
fragmented, since hospitals are generally larger and draw on more
diverse sources of revenue.2 89 Finally, hospitals that elect not to
participate in ACOs face the risk of substantial revenue declines since
ACOs are expected to drive savings primarily through decreases in
hospital services expenditures. Joining ACOs would give hospitals an
opportunity to offset some of this declining revenue through shared
savings payments.
The remaining two reasons for not treating hospital ACOs
differently than physician ACOs for purposes of antitrust review-
that hospitals are the most promising vehicle for generating savings in
the health care system and that the market power of certain physician
groups is not materially different than that of hospitals-also do not
counsel against adding a two-sided financial risk-sharing requirement
for hospital ACOs. The potential to drive efficiencies through
decreases in provision of hospital services cuts both ways: since
288. For example, hospitals have been operating under the Medicare prospective
payment system-a form of bundled payment-since the 1980s, whereas Medicare and
most insurers still reimburse physicians on a fee-for-service basis. See supra notes 22, 45.
289. Cf Gaynor & Haas-Wilson, supra note 224, at 148 (explaining that shift of risk
from insurers to providers with the rise of capitation under managed care drove hospitals
to consolidate in order to diversify against risk).
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hospitals are likely to see the biggest decline in volume if ACOs are
successful, they also have the greatest incentive to offset those
potential revenue losses either by undermining ACO cost-saving
efforts or using the additional market power associated with ACO
membership to negotiate substantially higher prices. Similarly, the
fact that certain physician groups have as much market power as
hospitals is not so much an argument against increasing antitrust
scrutiny for hospitals as it is an argument in favor of increasing
antitrust scrutiny of physician groups with substantial market power.
Finally, it is worth noting that somewhat raising the antitrust
scrutiny bar may have the salutary effect of ensuring that only those
entities likely to be successful invest in formation of an ACO.
Professor Lawrence Casalino, a strong proponent of ACOs, has
recommended that FTC and DOJ use antitrust regulations to weed
out
either sham organizations or well-meaning but incompetent
organizations, who are only certain to fail. We don't want 80
percent of ACOs failing. On the other hand, I don't think we
want 100 percent of ACOs succeeding. Then we're setting the
bar too high. So I think the [antitrust scrutiny] bar.., should be
set in a place where people who sincerely want to do this are
encouraged to try.., but that the rate of success will be
reasonably high.290
Given that financially integrated provider networks have a proven
record of reducing costs, raising the antitrust scrutiny bar by including
a two-sided financial risk-sharing requirement will make it more
likely that only those entities likely to be successful at reducing
expenditures will choose to participate in the Shared Savings
Program. At the same time, by setting a higher bar for antitrust
review of hospital ACOs that are not committed to both clinical and
financial integration, FTC and DOJ will discourage providers from
wastefully investing in formation of entities that are unlikely to
achieve the efficiency goals of the ACO program.
D. The Dangers of "Pegging" FTC and DOJ Antitrust Review to
Standards Set by Other Agencies
As discussed above, the Shared Savings Program participation
rule and the antitrust enforcement policy for commercial ACOs are
290. Lawrence P. Casalino, Livingston Farrund Professor of Pub. Health & Chief, Div.
of Outcomes and Effectiveness Research, Dep't of Pub. Health, Weill Cornell Med. Coll.,
Remarks at ACO Workshop, supra note 23, at 27.
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highly interconnected. In particular, the ACO Statement provides
that all commercial ACOs satisfying the Shared Savings Program
participation requirements set out in the Rule will receive rule of
reason review.291 Commentators on the proposed Statement noted
that this is among the first instances where FTC and DOJ's antitrust
review standards are "peg[ged] ... to standards created by a different
[federal] agency. '"292
This Comment's analysis of the sufficiency of the antitrust safety
zone for ACOs that include hospitals illustrates the potential pitfalls
of FTC and DOJ tying their antitrust review standards to regulations
issued by other agencies. As noted above, under CMS' proposed rule
implementing the Shared Savings Program, all ACOs would have
been required to engage in some degree of two-sided risk sharing
during the first three years of the program. 93 CMS eliminated the
two-sided financial risk-sharing requirement in the final Rule, while
FTC and DOJ left the ACO Statement largely unchanged.29 4 The
safety zone set out in the ACO Statement was likely adequate under
CMS' proposed rule, but it is inadequate under CMS' final Rule
since, as the above analysis demonstrates, a financial integration
requirement is critical to mitigating the unique competitive risks
associated with hospital participation in ACOs. By tying the antitrust
safety zone requirements to the Shared Savings Program Rule, the
agencies effectively allowed CMS-an agency with a mission entirely
different than antitrust enforcement-to dangerously lower antitrust
review standards for ACOs, even in the absence of an official change
in FTC and DOJ policy.
291. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
292. See, e.g., Toby G. Singer & David R. Pearl, A Not So Modest Proposal? The
FTC/DOJ Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable
Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, COMPETITION
POL'Y INT'L ANTITRUST CHRON. 3 (May 12, 2011), https://www
.competitionpolicyinternationa.com/a-not-so-modest-proposa-theftc-doj -proposed-
statement-of-antitrust-enforcement-policy-regarding-accountabe-care-organizations-
participating-in-the-medicare-shared-savings-program/.
293. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
294. FTC and DOJ state that there are two significant differences between the final
ACO Statement and the proposed version: (1) the final ACO Statement applies to all
entities eligible to participate in the Shared Savings Program, not just entities formed after
March 23, 2010 and (2) the final ACO Statement does not contain language regarding a
mandatory antitrust review program since CMS dropped the antitrust preclearance for
high-share entities in the final Rule. See ACO Statement, supra note 24, at 67,026.
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In response to substantial criticism from prospective ACO
participants and other stakeholders, 95 CMS significantly loosened the
Shared Savings Program participation requirements in the final
Rule.2 96 If the program fails to generate substantial interest from
providers, the agency may face pressure to further loosen program
requirements. This may mean, for example, that the agency could
abandon its plan to require ACOs to engage in two-sided risk sharing
after their initial three-year contract period (as it did with the initial
contract two-sided risk-sharing requirement in the proposed rule).
Some arguments for loosening the Rule may have merit on an
individual basis, particularly from CMS' perspective since the
agency's goal in drafting regulations is to make the Shared Savings
Program as effective as possible, which necessarily entails choosing
policies that will ensure there is robust participation in the program.
However, under the ACO Statement, the Rule and the ACO
Statement operate as a single regulatory structure and any changes to
one must be analyzed in the context of the other. Consequently, FTC
and DOJ must remain vigilant and revisit the ACO Statement each
time CMS modifies the Rule to ensure that the ACO Statement
adequately protects against the competitive risks posed by health care
provider networks.
CONCLUSION
ACOs are a promising vehicle for remedying the continuing
provider fragmentation in the United States health care system.
Through formation of networks of providers, ACOs have the
potential to improve care coordination and thus improve quality and
reduce costs. However, these potential benefits also come with
attendant risks, most notably the risk that as provider groups come
together in ACOs and jointly negotiate with payers, they will be able
295. See Jane Norman, Sebelius: HHS Will "Very Seriously" Consider Criticism of
ACO Rule, COMMONWEALTH FUND, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/
Newsletters/Washington-Health-Policy-in-Review/201 1/May/May-16-2011/HHS-Will-
Very-Seriously-Consider-Criticism.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
296. In addition to eliminating the two-sided financial risk-sharing requirement in the
first three years for ACOs opting for the Track 1 model, the final Rule reduces the
number of quality measures used to monitor ACOs, increases the potential amount of
shared savings payments, eliminates electronic health record use as a condition of program
participation, and expands the number of entities eligible to participate in the program.
For a table outlining key differences between the proposed rule and the final rule, see
CMS, PROPOSED RULE VERSUS FINAL RULE FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM, available at
http://www.cms.gov/ACO/Downloads/Appendix-ACO-Table.pdf.
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to extract significant price increases due to their enhanced bargaining
leverage. This concern is particularly salient for ACOs that include
hospitals, given the existing concentration in the hospital
marketplace, the special concerns posed by horizontal and vertical
integration between physicians and hospitals, and the risks associated
with positioning hospitals as the dominant figure in the provider
marketplace.
Under FTC and DOJ's antitrust enforcement regime for
commercial ACOs, the antitrust enforcement environment for
hospital ACOs would not be materially different than the
environment facing physician-only ACOs. This represents a
significant change from the Guidelines, under which multiprovider
networks would be subject to more rigorous scrutiny than physician-
only networks. While this Comment agrees with FTC and DOJ that
the benefits associated with hospital participation in ACOs warrant a
more lenient antitrust enforcement environment for hospital ACOs
than under the Guidelines, it also argues that the safety zone
requirements set out in the ACO Statement are insufficiently robust.
In particular, it recommends that the agencies modify the safety zone
to require hospital ACOs engage in two-sided financial risk sharing.
In addition, this Comment urges FTC and DOJ to closely monitor the
impact of future changes to CMS' Shared Savings Program Rule on
the adequacy of the antitrust enforcement regime set out in the ACO
Statement.
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